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I. INTRODUCTION
For a lender making a loan secured by a mortgage' on an
office building, shopping center, apartment complex, or other
income-producing property,2 rents are an important aspect of
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1. The term "mortgage" as used in this Article is intended to encom-
pass mortgages, deeds of trust and other similar instruments used in the
various states to create an interest in real estate to secure a loan. The
terms "borrower' and "lender' will generally be used rather than the
traditional terms "mortgagor and "mortgagee," and in the bankruptcy
context the borrower may be referred to as the "debtor" or "debtor in
possession." With regard to pronouns, the lender will be referred to as
"it" since most commercial real estate loans are made by institutional
lenders, and the borrower will be referred to as "he" although most com-
mercial real estate developers own property and borrow through entities.
2. Shopping centers, office buildings, and apartment complexes are
typical examples of income-producing properties that generate rents be-
cause these types of improvements are occupied by tenants who pay rent
to the landlord pursuant to a lease. Other types of income-producing real
property, including hotels, parking lots, student dormitories, and nursing
homes, do not involve a landlord/tenant relationship in its strict sense
and raise special issues which are not within the primary scope of this
Article. See infra note 271 and accompanying text.
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the security for the loan. During the term of a loan secured by
an income-producing property, the interests of both borrower
and lender are usually best served by the use of rents to pay
costs of operation and maintenance of the property and inter-
est on and principal of the loan. In the event of a default, the
interests of the borrower and the lender may become antago-
nistic with regard to the use of rents accruing from the proper-
ty. The borrower, facing the possibility of losing the property
by foreclosure sale, may find it to his advantage to "milk" the
property of its rents by applying rents for purposes unrelated
to the property or the mortgage loan.' The lender's interest, on
the other hand, is best served if rents collected during the time
period between default and foreclosure continue to be applied
to operation, maintenance, and loan payments. Therefore, the
lender will typically require the borrower at the time of the
closing of the loan to execute an assignment of rents' which
the lender hopes will give it the ability to control rents from
the mortgaged property in the event of a default.5
3. The borrower may use the rents to benefit other properties he
owns, to build a "war chest" of funds to pay fees involved in a bankrupt-
cy filing or protracted litigation with the lender, or simply to line his
pockets.
4. "Assignment of rents" is the most commonly used name for the
instrument or mortgage provision by which a lender attempts to take a
security interest in rents, and the author will use the term "assignment
of rents" in discussing current law. The author will use the term "securi-
ty interest" in discussing proposed changes in the law because of the
widespread understanding of that term as used in the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. Whether a mortgage lender's interest in rents is described as a
security interest, a pledge, a mortgage, an assignment, or an absolute as-
signment, it is in fact an interest granted for the purpose of providing
security for the loan. See infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
5. Loan documents may also contain restrictions on the ability of the
borrower to enter into, modify, or terminate leases or accept prepayments
of rent without the consent of the lender. Furthermore, the documents
may require that rents collected by the borrower be applied to payment
of expenses of operation and maintenance of the property and payment of
amounts due the lender. Finally, tenants may be required to acknowledge
the assignment of rents and the restrictions on modification or termina-
tion of leases or on prepayments of rent. Where a loan is nonrecourse
with no personal liability for repayment imposed upon the borrower, the
lender is particularly interested in the disposition of rents of the proper-
ty, and the application of rents for purposes other than operation, main-
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While the antagonistic positions of the borrower and lender
in the event of default are not surprising, what is noteworthy
is the confusion surrounding the law which relates to assign-
ments of rents." In many cases the rules governing assign-
ments of rents are based on ancient real property concepts,
and the policies behind the rules bear very little relation to the
realities of the modern commercial real estate loan. Further-
more, there is a wide variation in treatment of the assignment
of rents among jurisdictions,' with some jurisdictions honoring
the contractual terms of the agreement between borrower and
lender,8 and other jurisdictions imposing onerous restrictions
on the enforcement of the agreement despite its contractual
terms.9 Both the Uniform Land Security Interest Act (ULSIA)
tenance, or payment of the loan may be an exception to the nonrecourse
status of the loan.
6. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SECURITY (MORTGAGES),
Reporters' Memorandum § 4.2 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1992).
7. Not only is there lack of uniformity in state law governing assign-
ments of rents, but real estate mortgage law in general is an area in
which there is little uniformity among states. See U.L.S.IA, Prefatory
Note, 7A U.L.A. 188 (Supp. 1993). An argument can be made that there
is no need for uniformity in the area of land transactions because land
cannot be moved from state to state. See U.L.S.IA. § 102 cmt. 1, 7A
U.L.A. 194 (Supp. 1993). However, lenders and developers are more fre-
quently entering into transactions in numerous states, and loans secured
by real estate are increasingly transferred in the secondary market. See
U.L.S.IA., Prefatory Note, 7A U.L.A. 188, 189-90 (Supp. 1993). Lenders
making real estate loans on a nationwide basis must use different forms
of documentation and hire different attorneys in each state in which they
are making loans. The resulting costs are ultimately passed on to bor-
rowers in the form of higher interest rates and fees and decreased avail-
ability of loans, or on to the consumer in the form of lower interest rates
on savings or higher insurance premiums, or on to the taxpayer when
the lending institution is taken over by the government. But see Michael
H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance Law in
the 1990s and the Implications of Changing Financial Markets, 64 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1261 (1991) (making a convincing argument for the continu-
ation of diversity in residential real estate finance law).
8. See, e.g., FDIC v. International Property Management, Inc., 929
F.2d 1033, 1038 (5th Cir. 1991); In re Townside Partners, Ltd., 125 B.R.
8, 10 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1991) (citing Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. Co. v.
Williams, 506 F.2d 1242 (4th Cir. 1974)).
9. See, e.g., In re Century Inv. Fund VIII Ltd. Partnership, 937 F.2d
371, 377 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Wisconsin courts have disapproved of [provi-
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and the new Restatement (Third) of Property-Security (Mort-
gages) address the issue of rents as security for the mortgage
loan, and both would make it easier for a lender to control
rents after default. 1" However, reform in this area and move-
ment towards uniformity among the states have been slow to
come.
The complexity of the law and lack of uniformity among the
states make assignments of rents difficult for practitioners to
draft, for borrowers to operate under, for lenders to enforce,
and for courts to interpret. Furthermore, this complexity and-
lack of uniformity impose unnecessary costs on lenders and
make it difficult for lenders to make underwriting decisions on
commercial real estate loans. If a lender is unable to take
control of rents after default and the borrower misapplies
rents, the value of the mortgaged property may be impaired by
neglect, and the total indebtedness may increase substantially
due to unpaid interest accruing on the loan. Both of these
factors increase the likelihood of a deficiency upon foreclo-
sure," and if the deficiency is not collected from the borrower,
sions giving a lender the right to rents immediately upon default] ....
[Riather than allowing the transfer to be self-executing, they have insist-
ed that a mortgagee assert its claim by taking an affirmative action to
perfect its interests.") (citation omitted); Drummond v. Farm Credit Bank
(In re Kurth Ranch), 110 B.R. 501, 506 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990) ("[U1n
Montana, a mortgagee may secure a security interest in the rents from
the mortgaged property only by appointment of a receiver, even
though ... the mortgage instrument contains an assignment of rent
provision upon default."); Hall v. Goldsworthy, 14 P.2d 659, 661 (Kan.
1932) ("Reason and authority lead us to the conclusion that the mortgag-
ee is not entitled to the benefits of the contract for the rents and profits
of the land until he has, by appropriate proceedings through the courts,
taken the possession and control of such rents and profits.").
10. See U.L.S.IA. § 505(a), 7A U.L.A. 222 (Supp. 1993); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SECURITY (MORTGAGES) § 4.2 (Tentative Draft No.
2, 1992).
11. The purchase price paid at a foreclosure sale is applied first to
the costs of sale and the indebtedness owed to the foreclosing lender. 1
GARRARD GLENN, MORTGAGES, DEEDS OF TRUST AND OTHER SECURITY DE-
VICES AS To LAND, § 101 (1943). Where proceeds of the foreclosure sale
are insufficient to pay the entire indebtedness owed to the foreclosing
lender, the indebtedness remaining after the application of the foreclosure
sale proceeds is called the deficiency. Id. Where the indebtedness is re-
course indebtedness, and in the absence of an applicable anti-deficiency
[Vol.46:349352
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it will be a loss to the lender. Additionally, tenants of mort-
gaged property may be affected adversely if rents are diverted
by the borrower rather than being used for operation and
maintenance of the property.'2
The confusion in the law governing assignments of rents
affects not only the parties directly involved, but in significant
ways has implications for the national economy, citizens in
general, and the efficacy of the federal bankruptcy system.
Loans secured by commercial real estate make up a substan-
tial percentage of the loan portfolios of our nation's banks,
savings and loans, and insurance companies. 3 Given the gen-
eral decrease in real estate values across the country" and
the increase in the number of defaults,"5 the treatment of
rents in the period between default and foreclosure has become
a more significant issue. Of utmost concern is the extent to
statute, the borrower has personal liability for the deficiency. The accrual
of unpaid interest increases the indebtedness secured by the mortgaged
property, and a lower property value, resulting from the neglect of the
mortgaged property is likely to decrease the purchase price at foreclosure.
Both of these factors therefore contribute to a higher deficiency.
12. See Commercial & Public Sector Issues in Bankruptcy: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Economic & Commercial Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1992) (statement of
Ronald DeKoven on behalf of the American Bankers Association) [herein-
after 1992 House Subcomm. Hearing]; Commercial & Credit Issues in
Bankruptcy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Administrative
Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 88-
89 (1991) (statement of Mary Jane Flaherty on behalf of the American
Council of Life Insurance) [hereinafter 1991 Senate Subcomm. Hearing].
13. Commercial real estate loans make up 25% of the loan portfolios
of banks. Strengthening the Supervision and Regulation of the Depository
Institutions: Hearings of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. vol. 2 at 1820-21 (1991) (statement
of Sen. Wirth, confirmed by William Taylor, Chairman, FDIC). See also
Eva Pomice, The Panhandle Syndrome, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan.
29, 1990, at 43. Insurance companies are also major lenders in the com-
mercial real estate market. See 1991 Senate Subcomm. Hearing, supra
note 12, at 187 (statement of James W. Nelson on behalf of the Mort-
gage Bankers Association); More Banks Foreclose on High-Rise Buildings,
THE SEATTLE TIMmS, Sept. 14, 1991, at A14.
14. See Real Estate Woes Spread to California Banks, CHICAGO TRI-




which confusion over the treatment of rents during this period
makes lenders more reluctant to loan money."' A negative
impact on lenders' willingness to do business has serious eco-
nomic consequences nationwide. Furthermore, because the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Resolu-
tion Trust Corporation (RTC) now own a significant number of
real estate loans," taxpayers may ultimately absorb the loss-
es of uncollected deficiencies resulting from misapplication of
rents by borrowers.
In bankruptcy the problem is compounded. Once a borrower
has filed for protection under the Bankruptcy Code, the lender
is delayed in the exercise of its remedies, 8 and if the lender's
interest in rents is not protected during the pendency of bank-
ruptcy, the borrower, as debtor in possession, may misapply
rents for a longer period. 9 In addition, inconsistent treatment
of assignments of rents by the bankruptcy courts? has result-
ed in a massive amount of litigation in the bankruptcy arena
between borrowers and lenders.2' Not only is this litigation an
16. See 1991 Senate Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 12, at 213 (state-
ment of William L. Norton III on behalf of the American Bankers Asso-
ciation).
17. See Robert A. Rosenblatt, RTC Rebuked Over Handling of S & L
Clean-up, LA. TIMES, June 11, 1991, at Al; Mitchell Zuckoff, Fleet Sets
Plans to Deal With Bad Debt, THE BOSTON GLOBE, June 12, 1991, Econo-
my Sec. at 37.
18. See infra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
19. See 1991 Senate Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 12, at 218 (state-
ment of William L. Norton III on behalf of the American Bankers Asso-
ciation).
20. Treatment of the assignment of rents in bankruptcy has ranged
from holdings that completely disregard any interest of a lender in rents
covered by an assignment of rents, see, e.g., In re Multi-Group III Ltd.
Partnership, 99 B.R. 5 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1989); Exchange Nat'l Bank v.
Gotta (In re Gotta), 47 B.R. 198 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985), to holdings
that rents covered by. an assignment of rents are not part of the bank-
ruptcy estate because the lender owns the rents, see, e.g., Imperial Gar-
dens Liquidating Trust v. Northwest Commons, Inc. (In re Northwest
Commons, Inc.), 136 B.R. 215 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991); In re Carter, 126
B.R. 811 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991).
21. See 1992 House Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 12, at 135 (state-
ment of Lawrence P. King on behalf of the National Bankruptcy Con-
ference) (classifying the treatment of rents in bankruptcy as "a very
much litigated problem"). The author found more than 300 bankruptcy
354 [Vol.46:349
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inefficient use of the funds of bankruptcy estates and our
nation's lenders, but the additional costs imposed on lenders
may reduce the availability of real estate loans.'
Controversy surrounding the treatment of rents as security
for the mortgage loan has recently caught the attention of the
reporters for the new Restatement' and the committee
cases reported from 1980 to the present involving the issue of rents. See,
e.g., Steinberg v. CrossLand Mortgage Corp. (In re Park at Dash Point
L.P.), 985 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1993); Vienna Park Properties v. United
Postal Say. Ass'n (In re Vienna Park Properties), 976 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.
1992); Virginia Beach Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wood, 901 F.2d 849
(10th Cir. 1990); Saline State Bank v. Mahloch, 834 F.2d 690 (8th Cir.
1987); Casbeer v. State Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Casbeer), 793 F.2d
1436 (5th Cir. 1986); Wolters Village, Ltd. v. Village Properties, Ltd. (In
re Village Properties, Ltd.), 723 F.2d 441 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
974 (1984); Waldron v. Northwest Acceptance Corp. (In re Johnson), 62
B.R. 24 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986); J.H. Streiker & Co. v. SeSide Co. (In re
SeSide Co.), 152 B.R. 878, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Glessner v. Union Natl
Bank & Trust Co. (In re Glessner), 140 B.R. 556 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1992);
In re Northport Marina Assocs., 136 B.R. 911 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992); In
re White Plains Dev. Corp., 136 B.R. 93 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re
Rancourt, 123 B.R. 143 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991); In re Somero, 122 B.R.
634 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991); In re Raleigh/Spring Forest Apartments
Assocs., 118 B.R. 42 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1990); Drummond v. Farm Credit
Bank (In re Kurth Ranch), 110 B.R. 501 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990); North-
western Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Metro Square (In re Metro Square), 106
B.R. 584 (D. Minn. 1989); In re Multi-Group III Ltd. Partnership, 99
B.R. 5 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1989); In re TM Carlton House Partners, Ltd., 91
B.R. 349 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); McCombs Properties VI, Ltd. v. First
Texas Say. Ass'n (In re McCombs Properties VI, Ltd.), 88 B.R. 261
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988); In re Mears, 88 B.R. 419 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1988); In re Association Ctr. Ltd. Partnership, 87 B.R. 142 (Bankr. W.D.
Wash. 1988); In re Prichard Plaza Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 84 B.R. 289
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1988); In re Gelwicks, 81 B.R. 445 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1987); In re Hamlin's Landing Joint Venture, 77 B.R. 916 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1987); FDIC v. Lancaster (In re Sampson), 57 B.R. 304 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1986); United States v. Farrell (In re Fluge), 57 B.R. 451 (Bankr.
D.N.D. 1985); Consolidated Capital Income Trust v. Colter, Inc. (In re
Consolidated Capital Income Trust), 47 B.R. 1008 (D. Colo. 1985); Ex-
change Natl Bank v. Gotta (In re Gotta), 47 B.R. 198 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
1985).
22. See 1991 Senate Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 12 at 213 (state-
ment of William L. Norton III on behalf of the American Bankers Asso-
ciation).
23. The reporters for the Restatement, Grant Nelson and Dale Whit-
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charged with recommending revisions to Article 9 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code (UCC),' as well as lawmakers on Cap-
itol Hill. Congress recently came quite close to passing a bank-
ruptcy reform bill that would have addressed the issue of per-
fection of an assignment of rents in bankruptcy,' and a simi-
lar bill has now been reintroduced in the Senate.' Even if a
bankruptcy reform bill does eventually pass, it will not solve
the underlying problems with assignments of rents because the
issues arising in bankruptcy are not caused by deficiencies in
bankruptcy law but by problems at the state law level. Neither
a discussion of how rents covered by an assignment of rents
should be treated under existing bankruptcy law nor a discus-
sion of how bankruptcy law should be reformed is within the
scope of this Article." Rather, the focus of this Article is on
changes that should be made in state law to provide a more
rational treatment of the assignment of rents both in and out-
side of bankruptcy.
The author proposes that rents be integrated into Article 9
of the UCC and treated essentially the same as accounts are
treated under Article 9.' A borrower could then grant a secu-
man, considered the section covering security interests in rents to be the
most important section of Tentative Draft No. 2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROPERTY-SECURED (MORTGAGES), Reporters' Memorandum § 4.2 (Ten-
tative Draft No. 2, 1992).
24. See AM. LAW INST. AND NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, REPORT OF THE PEB STUDY GROUP ON ARTICLE 9 OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 60 (1992) [hereinafter PEB STUDY GROUP
REPORT].
25. See infra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
26. See S. 540, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 206 (1993).
27. A number of recent articles have addressed these issues. See Craig
H. Averch, Revisitation of the Fifth Circuit Opinions of Village Properties
and Casbeer: Is Post-Petition 'Perfection" of an Assignment of Rents Nec-
essary to Characterize Rental Income as Cash Collateral?, 93 COM. L.J.
516 (1988); James McCafferty, The Assignment of Rents in the Crucible of
Bankruptcy, 94 COM. L.J. 433 (1989); Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., Recogniz-
ing Lenders' Rents Interests in Bankruptcy, 27 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR.
J. 281 (1992); Glenn R. Schmitt, The Continuing Confusion Over Real
Property Rents as Cash Collateral in Bankruptcy: The Need for a Consis-
tent Interpretation, 5 DEPAUL BUs. L.J. 1 (1992-93).
28. Other commentators have recommended that rents be included
within the scope of Article 9. See R. Wilson Freyermuth, Of Hotel Reve-
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rity interest in rents to a lender in much the same manner
that a borrower may now grant a security interest in accounts.
This proposal would provide a workable solution to the prob-
lems arising under both state law and bankruptcy law with
regard to security interests in rents and would provide for
uniformity among the states. Furthermore, the proposal would
be easy to implement because of existing statutory and case
law relating to security interests in accounts.
In 1990 the Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC estab-
lished a study committee to recommend revisions to Arti-
cle 9,' and the study committee has recently recommended
that a drafting committee be formed to revise Article 9 in ac-
cordance with its report. Although the study committee did
not recommend that rents be included within the scope of Arti-
cle 9, it did recommend that the drafting committee "give seri-
ous consideration to the reports of the advisory group on real
estate-related collateral,"" and among the reports of the advi-
sory group is a minority position report recommending amend-
ment of Article 9 to encompass rents. 2 The author believes
that the drafting committee should give serious consideration
to this important issue.
In this Article the author will provide an introduction to the
problems associated with assignments of rents by discussing
the nature of rents and their treatment in the absence of an
assignment. Next, the author will examine in detail the issues
arising with regard to assignments of rents under current law
both in and outside of the bankruptcy context. Finally, the
author will discuss the proposal that rents be integrated into
nues, Rents and Formalism in the Bankruptcy Courts: Implications for
Reforming Commercial Real Estate Finance, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1461,
1536-41 (1993); Alexander Rostocki, Jr., Perfecting Security Interests in
Rents: Article 9 Must be Amended, 24 UCC L.J. 151 (1991); Note, An
Article Nine Scope Problem-Mortgages, Leases, and Rents as Collateral,
47 U. COLO. L. REV. 449, 459-60 (1976). In addition, a minority of the
members of the PEB Study Group's Advisory Group on Real Estate-Relat-
ed Collateral recommended that rents be incorporated into Article 9. See
PEB STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 24, app. at 196.
29. PEB STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 24, at 1.
30. Id. at 6.
31. Id. at 66.
32. Id. app. at 196.
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Article 9 of the UCC.
II. THE NATURE OF RENTS AND THEIR TREATMENT IN THE
ABSENCE OF AN ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS
Before beginning a detailed discussion of the treatment of
assignments of rents, it is instructive to examine the character
of rents and the treatment of rents in a mortgage loan transac-
tion in the absence of an assignment of rents. The right to
unaccrued rents from real property is an interest in land which
is incident to the landlord's reversion,' but rents may be sev-
ered from real property.' Severance occurs when rents ac-
crue or are collected,' or when the right to unaccrued rents
is assigned to a third party,37 reserved in a transfer of the
reversion," or pledged.39 Because unsevered rents are a part
33. See Valley Natl Bank v. Avco Dev. Co., 480 P.2d 671, 674 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1971); Winnisimmet Trust Inc. v. Libby, 122 N.E. 575, 576
(Mass. 1919); First & Citizens Nat1 Bank v. Sawyer, 10 S.E.2d 656, 658
(N.C. 1940); Marine Nat'l Bank v. Northwest Pa. Bank & Trust Co., 454
A.2d 67, 70 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); Schmid v. Baum's Home of Flowers,
Inc., 37 S.W.2d 105, 108 (Tenn. 1931). Blackstone listed rents among the
ten principal incorporeal hereditaments. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES *20. See generally 2 A. JAMES CASNER, AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 9.41 (1952).
34. See Brack v. Coburn, 196 S.W.2d 230, 234 (Ark. 1946); Valley
Nat7 Bank, 480 P.2d at 674; Marine Nat'l Bank, 454 A.2d at 70;
Schmid, 37 S.W.2d at 108; Treetop Apartments Gen. Partnership v. Oys-
ter, 800 S.W.2d 628, 629 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
35. See White v. Irvine Kentucky State Medical Ass'n, 22 S.W.2d 778,
778 (Mo. 1929); Marine Nat'l Bank, 454 A.2d at 70; 2 CASNER, supra
note 33, § 9.41.
36. See In re Park at Dash Point L.P., 121 B.R. 850, 855 (Bankr.
W.D. Wash. 1990), affd sub nom. Steinberg v. CrossLand Mortgage Corp.
(In re Park at Dash Point L.P.), 152 B.R. 300 (W.D. Wash. 1991), affd,
985 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1993); Treetop, 800 S.W.2d at 629. There appears
to be a split in authority as to whether severance of rents occurs upon
accrual or collection. See infra note 57 for a discussion of a related split
in authority.
37. See Brack, 196 S.W.2d at 234; Valley Nat'l Bank, 480 P.2d at 674;
Winnisimmet, 122 N.E. at 576; Schmid, 37 S.W.2d at 108.
38. See Jim Davis & Co. v. Albuquerque Fed. Say. & Loan Assoc., 536
So. 2d 55, 58 (Ala. 1988) (quoting Walsh v. Bank of Moundville, 132 So.
52, 53 (Ala. 1930)); Brack, 196 S.W.2d at 234; Winnisimmet, 122 N.E. at
576; Tinnon v. Tanksley, 408 S.W.2d 98, 105 (Mo. 1966). A sale of real
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of the real property to which they relate, they are covered by a
mortgage of that real property, and a foreclosure sale purchas-
er is entitled to rents accruing after the date of foreclosure."
However, because the right to unaccrued rents is incident to
the possession of the property,"1 the borrower has the right to
rents collected from the property until the lender takes posses-
sion of the property either as a mortgagee in possession or as a
foreclosure sale purchaser, or until a receiver takes possession
of the property.42
A mortgage lender's ultimate remedy is foreclosure of the
mortgaged property,43 but the time period required for the
completion of a foreclosure varies significantly from state to
state." During the interim period between a borrower's de-
property will convey the 'right to unaccrued rents unless the right to
unaccrued rents is expressly reserved. Jim Davis & Co., 536 So. 2d at
58 (quoting Walsh, 132 So. at 53); Winnisimmet, 122 N.E. at 576;
Tinnon, 408 S.W.2d at 105; CASNER, supra note 33, § 9.45.
39. See Treetop, 800 S.W.2d at 629 (citing' Standridge v. Vines, 81
S.W.2d 289, 290 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935)).
40. See Jim Davis & Co., 536 So. 2d at 58 (quoting Walsh, 132 So. at
53); Security Say. & Loan Soc. v. Dudley, 26 P.2d 384, 385 (Wash. 1933).
Because the foreclosure will cut off leases that are junior to the mort-
gage, the foreclosure sale purchaser will not be able to require junior
tenants to stay in possession and pay rent in the absence of an agree-
ment to that effect. See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL
ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 4.22-23 (2d ed. 1985).
41. See Grafeman Dairy Co. v. Mercantile Club, 241 S.W. 923, 927
(Mo. 1922); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Begin, 16 N.E.2d 1015, 1016
(Ohio Ct. App. 1938).
42. See Teal v. Walker, 111 U.S. 242, 248 (1884); Simpson v.
Ferguson, 44 P. 484, 485 (Cal. 1896) (en banc); Mid-Continent Supply Co.
v. Hauser, 269 P.2d 453, 458 (Kan. 1954); Grafeman Dairy, 241 S.W. at
927 (Mo. 1922); Wyckoff v. Scofield, 98 N.Y. 475, 477 (1885); Metropolitan
Life, 16 N.E.2d at 1016; Treetop, 800 S.W.2d at 629.
43. Prior to the consummation of a foreclosure, the borrower has the
equity of redemption which gives him the right after default to pay the
debt with interest and thereby to redeem the property from the encum-
brance of the mortgage. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 40, § 7.1.
44. See ABA Report of Committee on Mortgage Law & Practice, Cost
and Time Factors in Foreclosure of Mortgages, 3 REAL PROP., PROB. &
TR. J. 413, 414 (1968). A number of states give the borrower a statutory
right of redemption for a period which begins after foreclosure, and in
these states it is only after the statutory redemption period has expired
that the borrower's rights in the property are extinguished. See NELSON
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fault and the completion of a foreclosure, a lender may have
available certain'provisional remedies such as securing the
appointment of a receiver for the property, taking possession of
the property and collecting rents, or collecting rents without
taking possession of the property. Whether these provisional
remedies are available and whether they require special mort-
gage provisions in order to be available, depend upon the law
of the state where the mortgaged property is located and the
effect given in that state to the mortgage instrument itself.
4
& WHITMAN, supra note 40, § 8.4.
45. In some states, called "title theory" states, a mortgage lender is
treated as having legal title, in a sense, to the mortgaged property. Rob-
ert Kratovil, Mortgages-Problems in Possession, Rents, and Mortgagee
Liability, 11 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 4 (1961). In title theory states the lender
theoretically has the right upon the borrower's execution of the mortgage
to take possession of the mortgaged property and to collect the rents
therefrom. Id. at 5. In other states, called "lien theory" states, a mort-
gage lender is treated as having only a lien on the mortgaged property,
id. at 4, and the borrower retains the right to possession of the property
and rents until the lien has been foreclosed by the lender or until the
statutory redemption period has expired, id. at 5-6. Finally, in a few
states, called "intermediate" or "intermediate theory" states, a mortgage
lender has a hybrid interest which gives the lender the right to take
possession of the property and collect rents after a default under the
mortgage. Id. at 4-5. See generally NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 40, §
4.1-4.3. The majority of the states are lien theory states. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SECURITY (MORTGAGES) § 4.1 cmt. a (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1992).
As a practical matter the differences between title, lien, and inter-
mediate theory states may not be so great as they would first appear. In
many lien theory states a lender has the right to take possession of the
property and collect rents after default where there is a mortgage provi-
sion to that effect. See Kinnison v. Guaranty Liquidating Corp., 115 P.2d
450, 452 (Cal. 1941); Topeka Say. Ass'n v. Beck, 428 P.2d 779, 782 (Kan.
1967); Central Say. Bank v. First Cadco Corp., 181 N.W.2d 261, 264
(Neb. 1970); Carlquist v. Coltharp, 248 P. 481, 483 (Utah 1926). In a
title theory state a borrower and lender will generally agree to permit
the borrower to remain in possession of the property at least until de-
fault, see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 502 (West 1988) (giving a mort-
gage lender the right to take possession before or after breach which
implies the borrower generally has possession at the outset), and at least
one so-called "title theory" state gives the borrower a statutory right to
remain in possession until default in the absence of an agreement to the
contrary, see MASS. ANN. LAwS ch. 183, § 26 (Law. Co-op. 1987). In fact,
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In many jurisdictions a lender has the right to take posses-
sion of the mortgaged property upon default of the borrower
and collect rents from the property.46 Rents collected by a
lender in possession of mortgaged property must be applied to
the operation and maintenance of the property and to the pay-
ment of the indebtedness secured by the mortgage.47 Even in
those jurisdictions that do not permit a lender to take posses-
sion of mortgaged property, a lender has the right to the ap-
pointment of a receiver for the property upon making the re-
quired showing to a court of the necessity for a receiver.48 The
remedies of possession by a lender or receivership are appro-
priate where the borrower is wasting or mismanaging the
mortgaged property. However, a lender may want the ability
upon a default to control rents without taking possession of the
property or obtaining the appointment of a receiver49 and may
therefore require the execution by the borrower of an assign-
ment of rents in an attempt to make this remedy available.
III. STATE LAW TREATMENT OF THE ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS
Although the purpose of an assignment of rents executed by
a borrower to a mortgage lender is to permit the lender to
control rents from the mortgaged property in the event of a
default, different jurisdictions give varying degrees of effect to
the intent of the borrower and lender to accomplish this pur-
a lender would rarely want possession of mortgaged property upon the
execution of the mortgage because of the risks to the lender in posses-
sion. See infra notes 77-79. and accompanying text. Therefore, borrowers
and lenders in title theory states and in those lien theory states where it
is permissible, adopt by contract the treatment of the intermediate theory
states, giving the lender the right to take possession of the property and
to begin collecting rents upon default.
46. This is the case in intermediate theory and title theory states and
in those lien theory states in which a mortgage provision giving a lender
the right to take possession upon default is enforceable. See supra note
45.
47. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 40, § 4.27.
48. See infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
49. For a discussion of the disadvantages to a lender of the mortgagee




pose.' Some jurisdictions recognize the "absolute" assignment
of rents whereby the borrower and lender agree that the lender
will be entitled to rents immediately upon default by the bor-
rower without any action necessary on the part of the lend-
er,"' but other jurisdictions do not.5 Some jurisdictions that
purport to recognize the absolute assignment have a strong
policy against finding that a borrower and lender intended an
absolute assignment and make it virtually impossible to imple-
ment the absolute assignment.' In those jurisdictions which
do not recognize the absolute assignment or where a borrower
and lender have not successfully implemented one, a lender
must take some type of affirmative action in order to render an
assignment of rents operative or "activated" after a default by
the borrower.' Some states require that a lender take posses-
sion of the property, obtain the appointment of a receiver, or
take some other onerous action in order to activate an assign-
ment of rents." Other states permit a lender to activate an
assignment of rents by taking some nominal action such as
notifying tenants that subsequent rent payments should be
made directly to the lender.'
Regardless of whether the action required for activation of
an assignment of rents is nominal or onerous, a borrower has
the right to collect rents after default until the lender activates
its assignment of rents, and the lender has no rights whatsoev-
50. See infra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
52. See infra note 101.
53. See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
54. See Bevins v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 671 P.2d 875, 879 (Alas-
ka 1983); Martinez v. Continental Enters., 730 P.2d 308, 316 (Colo.
1986); Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex. 1981); Wuorinen v.
City Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 191 N.W.2d 27, 30 (Wis. 1971).
55. See, e.g., In re Park at Dash Point L.P., 121 B.R. 850, 855
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1990) (discussing Washington statute which requires
that the lender take possession of the property or obtain the appointment
of a receiver), affd sub noma. Steinberg v. CrossLand Mortgage Corp. (In
re Park at Dash Point L.P.), 152 B.R. 300 (W.D. Wash. 1991), affd, 985
F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1993); Martinez, 730 P.2d at 316 (requiring the lend-
er to gain actual possession or file a foreclosure action); Taylor, 621
S.W.2d at 594 (requiring the lender to obtain possession, impound the
rents, secure appointment of a receiver, or take some similar action).
56. See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
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er to those rents collected by the borrower prior to activa-
tion.57 The terminology often used to describe this concept is
that the security interest created by an assignment of rents is
"inchoate" until the lender has activated the assignment of
rents making the security interest "choate."' Some courts
equate activation, which makes an assignment of rents choate,
with perfection,59 while other courts equate activation with
57. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Liberdar Holding Corp., 74 F.2d 50, 51
(2d Cir. 1934); Dash Point, 121 B.R. at 855; In re Prichard Plaza Assocs.
Ltd. Partnership, 84 B.R. 289, 297 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988); Martinez, 730
P.2d at 316; Taylor, 621 S.W.2d at 595. But see In re Polo Club Apart-
ments Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 150 B.R. 840, 854 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1993) (interpreting Georgia law to give a lender with an activated assign-
ment of rents the right to rents collected by 'the borrower but not spent
at the time of activation as well as future rents).
There is a split in authority over whether a lender is entitled to
rents that are accrued but uncollected at the time of activation. Childs
Real Estate Co. v. Shelburne Realty Co., 143 P.2d 697, 700 (Cal. 1943).
Some courts hold that the lender is entitled to accrued but uncollected
rents, see Stowers v. Wheat, 78 F.2d 25, 32 (5th Cir. 1935); New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Fulton Dev. Corp., 193 N.E. 169, 171 (N.Y. 1934), while
other courts hold that the lender is not entitled to the rents, see Hart-
ford Realization Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 167 A. 728, 732 (Conn. 1933);
Paramount Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Sacks, 152 A. 457, 458 (N.J. Ch. Ct.
1930).
58. See Vienna Park Properties v. United Postal Say. Ass'n (In re
Vienna Park Properties), 976 F.2d 106, 112-13 (2d Cir. 1992); Dash
Point, 121 B.R. at 855; Federal Home Life Ins. Co. v. American Conti-
nental Corp. (In re American Continental Corp.), 105 B.R. 564, 573
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 1989); Martinez, 730 P.2d at 316. The term "inchoate"
means "partial; unfinished; begun, but not completed." BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 761 (6th ed. 1990).
59. See, e.g., Glessner v. Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re
Glessner), 140 B.R. 556, 558-60 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1992), overruled by KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 58-2343 (Supp. 1992); Drummond v. Farm Credit Bank (In
re Kurth Ranch), 110 B.R. 501, 506 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990); In re Multi-
Group III Ltd. Partnership, 99 B.R. 5, 8 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1989); In re
Association Ctr. Ltd. Partnership, 87 B.R. 142, 145 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.
1988), overruled by WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.28.230(3) (West 1992); In
re Hamlin's Landing Joint Venture, 77 B.R. 916, 920-21 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1987), overruled by FLA. STAT. ANN. § 697.07 (West Supp. 1993).
Although the terms "choate" and "perfected" have essentially the
same meaning, see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 241, 1137 (6th ed. 1990)
(defining "choate" as "[that which has become perfected"), the term "per-
fected" has become a term of art under Article 9 of the UCC. See infra
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enforcement.' This distinction, which becomes important if
there is a priority contest between creditors of the borrower or
if the borrower is in bankruptcy, will be discussed in part IV of
this Article. Regardless of whether activation is likened to
perfection or enforcement, the borrower has the right to accru-
ing rents until the security interest in the rents is activated.
Rents collected by the borrower are severed from the realty,
and the lender's interest under an assignment of rents does
not extend to these personal property "proceeds" of rents."'
This is the case in some jurisdictions despite an agreement of
the parties to the contrary.6
A. The Possession Requirement
For a lender to activate an assignment of rents in many
states, the lender must take possession of the mortgaged prop-
erty or take some other action, such as obtaining the appoint-
ment of a receiver, that is considered the equivalent of taking
possession of the property.' Several arguments have been
note 161 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Vienna Park Properties, 976 F.2d at 112-13; In re White
Plains Dev. Corp., 136 B.R. 93, 95 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); Dash Point,
121 B.R. at 856; Northwestern Natl Life Ins. Co. v. Metro Square (In re
Metro Square), 106 B.R. 584, 587 (D. Minn. 1989).
61. See Dash Point, 121 B.R. at 855.
62. See, e.g., Drummond v. Farm Credit Bank (In re Kurth Ranch),
110 B.R. 501, 506 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990) ([I]n Montana, a mortgagee
may secure a security interest in the rents from the mortgaged property
only by appointment of a receiver, even though . . . the mortgage instru-
ment contains an assignment of rent provision upon default."); Hall v.
Goldsworthy, 14 P.2d 659, 661 (Kan. 1932) ("Reason and authority lead
us to the conclusion that the mortgagee is not entitled to the benefits of
the contract for the rents and profits of the land until he has, by appro-
priate proceedings through the courts, taken the possession and control of
such rents and profits.").
63. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 52-53 (1979). See also
Freedman's Say. & Trust Co. v. Shepard, 127 U.S. 494, 502-03 (1888)
(requiring that the lender take actual possession, that a receiver take
possession, or that the lender's demand for possession be refused); Dash
Point, 121 B.R. at 856; Bevins v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 671 P.2d
875, 879 (Alaska 1983) (requiring the lender to take possession of the
property or the rents); Martinez v. Continental Enters., 730 P.2d 308,
316 (Colo. 1986) (requiring the lender to gain actual possession or file a
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made in support of the requirement that a lender take posses-
sion of the property or some equivalent action in order to col-
lect rents. Some courts have used the rationale that, because
an assignment of rents clause imposes no duty on the lender to
collect rents, to give the clause effect without requiring a lend-
er to take possession would deprive the borrower of the rents
while giving no assurance that the lender would actually col-
lect the rents and apply them to the debt." A second argu-
ment in support of the requirement that a lender take posses-
sion of the mortgaged property is that without such a re-
quirement it would be necessary to impose a constructive trust
on any rents collected by the borrower after default." Another
reason for the requirement of possession by a lender in order
to collect rents may lie in the treatment of the assignment of
rents in some jurisdictions as a "pledge" of the rents." The
pledge was a common law means of creating a security interest
in personal property and required delivery of actual or con-
structive possession to be effective.67 Where a lender's interest
foreclosure action); Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex. 1981)
(requiring the lender to obtain possession, impound the rents, secure
appointment of a -receiver, or take some similar action).
64. See Taylor, 621 S.W.2d at 594; In re Kidd's Estate, 292 N.Y.S.
888, 893 (Sur. Ct. 1936); Comment, The Mortgagee's Right to Rents After
Default, 50 YALE L.J. 1424, 1427 (1941); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note
40, § 4.35. A lender in possession has a duty to manage the property in
a reasonably prudent manner and therefore must make reasonable efforts
to collect the rents. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
65. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Liberdar Holding Corp., 74 F.2d 50, 51
(2d Cir. 1934); Taylor, 621 S.W.2d at 594; Kidd's Estate, 292 N.Y.S. at
893; Comment, supra note 64, at 1427; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note
40, § 4.35. The court in Prudential said that to hold that "mere words of
assignment can entitle a mortgagee to claim rentals which have been
collected by a mortgagor and mingled with its other property...
would . . . impose unworkable restrictions upon the industry in cases
where mortgagors have been led to suppose that they might rightfully
apply the rentals to their own business." 74 F.2d at 51.
66. See, e.g., Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Winslow Ctr. Assocs. (In
re Winslow Ctr. Assocs.), 50 B.R. 679, 681 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (apply-
ing New Jersey law); Taylor, 621 S.W.2d at 594.
67. See Colonial Trust Co. v. Stone Harbor Elec. Light & Power Co.,
280 F. 245 (D.N.J. 1922); Myers v. Brown, 112 A. 844 (N.J. Ch.), affd,
115 A. 926 (N.J. 1921). In fact, the common law pledge required that the
lender have the right to take possession of the pledged property before
19931 365
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in rents is treated as a pledge, the lender must take possession
of the rents by taking possession of the property to make the
pledge effective.
All of these arguments are easily refuted.. First, it is unlikely
that a lender entitled to collect rents for application to the
mortgage debt would fail to do so,' and if the lender did fail
to collect rents, the borrower could continue to collect them.
Where rents are collected by a borrower after default, the im-
position of a- constructive trust is unnecessary since there are
other means of dealing with the problem of rents collected and
spent by a borrower. For example, a lender might be permitted
to reach only those proceeds of rents that it could trace and
identify." Finally, where a borrower and lender do not intend
to create a common law pledge of rents or to require that the
lender take possession of the real property in order to collect
rents, it does not make sense to treat an assignment of rents
as a pledge of the rents.
A more legitimate reason for the requirement of activation of
an assignment of rents by possession or some equivalent action
may be based on the concern that the mortgaged property will
not be properly maintained if the lender takes the income of
the property but has no obligation to operate and maintain it.
A lender in possession of property has an obligation to main-
default, and "any arrangement under which the debtor had the right to
retain the collateral until default could not be a pledge." 1 GRANT
GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 1.1 (1965).
Therefore, a "pledge" of rents giving a lender the right to take possession
of the mortgaged property and to collect rents after the occurrence of a
default would not be a common law pledge of the rents.
68. See Comment, supra note 64, at 1426-27.
69. Where a lender has a perfected security interest in accounts, the
same issue can arise. Article 9 of the UCC deals with this problem by
providing that the security interest continues in proceeds of the accounts
and is perfected as to identifiable cash proceeds. U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(b)
(1990). A secured creditor's right to cash proceeds under Article 9 there-
fore depends upon its ability to trace and identify the funds. See JAMES
J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 23-7 (3d
ed. 1988). At least one court has analogized the tracing problem that can
arise when a borrower spends rents collected after default to the tracing
of proceeds of personal property security under Article 9. See In re
GOCO Realty Fund I, 151 B.R. 241, 250 n.8 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1993).
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tain the property,70 but a lender collecting rents without tak-
ing possession of the property may apply all of the rents to pay
the debt secured by the property.' Because the borrower still
in possession of his property is unlikely to have funds available
for continued operation and maintenance, it is possible that
giving the lender control of rents without requiring the lender
to take possession or some equivalent action could lead to the
waste of the mortgaged property. It is doubtful, however, that
such a scenario would occur with sufficient frequency to justify
the current state of the law. In fact, where a borrower is able
to retain control of rents after default because of the lender's
unwillingness to take onerous actions required for the lender
to gain control of rents, waste of the property is more likely to
occur. 2 Since the lender in most cases is relying on the mort-
gaged property as the primary source of security for the loan,
the lender has incentive to ensure that the property continues
to be well operated and maintained. To this end, the lender is
likely to release some portion of the rents to the borrower for
operation and maintenance of the property, and if the borrower
refuses to maintain the property, the lender will take posses-
sion or seek the appointment of a receiver as a means of pre-
venting the waste of the property.
From a lender's viewpoint, the requirement that the lender
take possession of the property or obtain the appointment of a
receiver in order to have access to rents after default is unde-
sirable. If the possession requirement is intended to protect the
lender against the problem of the borrower's misapplication of
rents, it fails to do so. Unless the borrower is willing to relin-
70. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
71. The lender must account to the borrower for rents and apply net
rentals against the indebtedness. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n v. Okla-
homa Tower Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 798 P.2d 618, 622 (Okla. 1990);
Randal v. Jersey Mortgage Inv. Co., 158 A. 865, 866 (Pa. 1932). There is
always some risk that a lender could misapply rents, but this risk exists
whether or not the lender is in possession of the property. In addition, a
lender is more likely to have assets available to satisfy a judgment for
misapplied rents than is a borrower in default.
72. See 1992 House Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 12, at 9 (statement
of Ronald DeKoven on behalf of the American Bankers Association); 1991
Senate Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 12, at 89 (statement of Mary Jane
Flaherty on behalf of the American Council of Life Insurance).
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quish possession of the property voluntarily, both taking pos-
session of property and securing the appointment of a receiver
require judicial intervention which can cause a substantial
delay and provide time for the borrower to collect and misapply
additional rents.7" Judicial action should not be necessary for
activation of an assignment of rents since a breach of the peace
is unlikely. 4 If the lender is attempting to enforce its security
interest in rents wrongfully, then the borrower would have
recourse to the courts just as with the wrongful enforcement of
any other non-judicial remedy." Because the ultimate remedy
of foreclosure is permitted without court action in many
states,76 it is difficult to justify a requirement of judicial ac-
tion for collection of rents.
When a lender becomes a mortgagee in possession, the lend-
er faces potential liability that can exceed even the amount of
the mortgage debt. First, and most significantly, the lender in
possession can have liability for environmental problems on
the property.77 Second, the lender can be held liable to the
73. Obtaining the appointment of a receiver requires a court order.
The mortgagee in possession remedy is designed to take effect without
judicial intervention, but if a borrower refuses to give up possession of
the mortgaged property, the lender may not resort to the use of force. At
best the lender might be able to use a summary eviction proceeding to
dispossess the borrower.
74. Because the lender need only notify tenants by mail that rents
should be paid to the lender, a breach of the peace would be less likely
in connection with the collection of rents by a lender than in connection
with a secured party's attempts to gain possession of tangible collateral
as is permitted under Article 9. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1990).
75. This shift of the burden to sue cannot be taken lightly. If a lend-
er can take rents without judicial interference, then some lenders will
take control of rents wrongfully. However, it is doubtful that this scenar-
io would occur with sufficient frequency to justify the current state of the
law.
76. See ABA Report of Committee on Mortgage Law & Practice, Cost
and Time Factors in Foreclosure of Mortgages, 3 REAL PROP., PROB. &
Ti. J. 413, 414 (1968).
77. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1988) [hereinafter CERCLA], im-
poses liability upon owners and operators of hazardous waste sites. Id. §
9607(a). "Owner or operator" does not include "a person who without
participating in the management of a . . . facility, holds indicia of owner-
ship primarily to protect his security interest in the . . . facility." Id. §
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borrower for mismanagement if the lender fails to "manage the
property in a reasonably prudent and careful manner so as to
keep it in a good state of preservation and productivity,""8 and
third, the lender may have liability to third parties for injuries
caused by dangerous conditions on the property.79 For these
reasons lenders are generally hesitant to become mortgagees in
possession.
There are also disadvantages to the lender of the receiver-
ship remedy. First, a lender may find it difficult to make the
necessary showing to a court that a receiver should be appoint-
ed. Generally, insolvency of the borrower and inadequacy of
the security are not by themselves sufficient to cause a court to
appoint a receiver; there must be some additional equitable
9601(20XA). However, a mortgagee in possession may be participating in
the management of a facility and therefore may not fit within this ex-
emption from liability.
A new Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule defines the
scope of the concept of "participation in management." 40 C.F.R. §
300.1100 (1992). The rule provides that participation in management
means "actual participation in the management or operational affairs of
the . . . facility." Id. § 300.1100(cXl). The rule expressly includes within
the meaning of the term the exercise of "decisionmaking control over the
borrower's environmental compliance" or the exercise of "control at a level
comparable to that of a manager of the borrower's enterprise" under
circumstances where the borrower remains in possession of the facility.
I&i Therefore, a lender's exercise of such control while in possession of
the facility is probably within the scope of "participation in management."
It is interesting to note that the EPA rule protects a lender in
possession of and operating the borrower's facility after foreclosure where
the lender is attempting to sell the property using certain means pre-
scribed by the rule, id. § 300.1100(d), but the rule provides no similar
safe harbor for a lender in possession prior to foreclosure.
78. Myers-Macomber Engineers v. M.L.W. Constr. Corp., 414 A.2d 357,
360 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979). See also Whitley v. Barnett, 131 N.W. 704,
705 (Iowa 1911); New York & Suburban Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Sanderman, 392 A.2d 635, 635 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978); Bomar v.
Smith, 195 S.W. 964, 980 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917). See generally NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 40, §§ 4.27-4.29.
79. See Daniels v. Hart, 118 Mass. 543, 544 (1875); Barter v. Wheeler,
49 N.H. 9, 34 (1869); City of Newark v. Sue Corp., 304 A.2d 567, 569
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973); Rogers v. Wheeler, 2 Lans. 486, 489
(N.Y. App. Div.), afld 43 N.Y. 598 (1870); Zisman v. City of Duquesne,
18 A.2d 95, 97 (Pa. Super. 1941); Sprague v. Smith, 29 Vt. 421 (1857).
See also NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 40, § 4.26.
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ground for the receivership "such as danger of loss, waste,
destruction, or serious impairment of the property."8 ° The ef-
fectiveness of a provision in loan documents that a lender is
entitled to the appointment of a receiver varies from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction,81 and even if the lender is able to procure
the appointment of a receiver, there is a risk that the receiver
will mismanage the property. Finally, in those states where
non-judicial foreclosure is permitted, there may be a risk that
a lender, by going to court to obtain the appointment of a re-
ceiver, will have elected a judicial foreclosure.82
Even from the borrower's viewpoint, requiring a lender to
take possession of property or obtain the appointment of a
receiver may be undesirable.' The borrower generally wants
to retain possession and control of the property until foreclo-
sure, and even a borrower in default may feel that his own
management of the property will be better than that of the
80. Grether v. Nick, 213 N.W. 304, 306, affd on reh'g, 215 N.W. 571
(Wis. 1927). See also Totten v. Harlowe, 90 F.2d 377, 380 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 301 U.S. 711 (1937); Atco Constr. & Dev. Corp. v. Beneficial
Sav. Bank, 523 So. 2d 747, 750 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); First Nat'l
Bank v. Illinois Steel Co., 51 N.E. 200, 204 (Ill. 1898); Cortleyeu v.
Hathaway, 11 N.J. Eq. 39, 43 (1855). See generally NELSON & WHITMAN,
supra note 40, § 4.34.
81. The presence of a receivership clause in the mortgage has virtual-
ly no effect in some states. See Gage v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
717 F. Supp. 745, 750-51 (D. Kan. 1989); Dart v. Western Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 438 P.2d 407, 409-10 (Ariz. 1968); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Broecker,
77 N.E. 1092, 1092 (Ind. 1906); Hazeltine v. Granger, 7 N.W. 74, 75
(Mich. 1880). In other states such a clause is helpful but not conclusive
on the issue. See Barclays Bank v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. Rptr. 743,
748 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Fleet Bank v. Zimelman, 575 A.2d 731, 734
(Me. 1990); Riverside Properties v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 590
S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). Finally, in a few states, such a
clause is enforceable by a lender without the necessity for a showing of
any of the ordinary grounds for the appointment of a receiver. See MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 559.17 (West Supp. 1993); Febbraro v. Febbraro, 416
N.Y.S.2d 59, 60 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
82. See First S. Properties, Inc. v. Vallone, 533 S.W.2d 339, 343 (Tex.
1976).
83. A borrower would prefer to impose these onerous requirements on
a lender only because the lender may be unwilling to exercise its rights




lender or of a receiver unfamiliar with the property and its
leases. If a borrower is better able to manage the property, he
will be able to generate more income than would a lender or
receiver in possession; therefore, a borrower would prefer that
a lender not take possession of property or secure the appoint-
ment of a receiver in order to activate its assignment of rents.
On the other hand, if a lender is collecting all of the income
from the property and applying it to payment of the debt, the
borrower may be unable. to operate or maintain the property.
Nevertheless, borrowers are in most cases willing to agree at
the time of the closing of the loan to give the lender control
over rents in the event of default.
Tenants of the property arguably have reason to favor the
requirement of activation of an assignment of rents by posses-
sion or some equivalent action. Tenants are concerned with the
general condition of the mortgaged property and with perfor-
mance of specific lease covenants, and a lender in possession
has an obligation to operate and maintain the property' and
may have liability for breaches of lease covenants." A lender
collecting rents without taking possession of mortgaged prop-
erty has no obligation to operate and maintain the property
and has no liability for breaches of lease covenants." Howev-
84. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
85. There is little authority on this issue, and most of the cases which
do address the issue deal with the liability of a mortgagee in possession
under a leasehold mortgage for payment of rent. There is a split in the
authority that does exist with some courts holding the lender liable for
covenants that run with the land, see, e.g., Williams v. Safe Deposit &
Trust Co., 175 A. 331, 334 (Md. 1934); Astor v. Hoyt, 5 Wend. 605, 617
(N.Y. 1830), and others finding the lender not liable, see, e.g., Johnson v.
Sherman, 15 Cal. 287, 293 (1860), Cargill v. Thompson, 59 N.W. 638
(Minn. 1894). See also Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., The Mortgagee's Interest
in Rents: Some Policy Considerations and Proposals, 29 KAN. L. REV. 1,
20-22 (1980).
86. Where a mortgage lender is collecting rents under an assignment
of rents, the lender is receiving the benefits of the leases on the mort-
gaged property, but the lender is not deemed to have assumed any of
the obligations under the leases. Kratovil, supra note 45, at 21-22. Be-
cause an assignment of rents is not a transfer of the landlord's reversion,
id. at 21 (citing Orman v. Burgess [sic], 217 Il1. App. 311 (1920);
Winnisimmet Trust Inc. v. Libby, 122 N.E. 575, 576 (Mass. 1919)), an
assignee of rents is not liable for the breach of lease covenants, Kratovil,
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er, where requirements imposed on lenders for taking control
of rents are so onerous that they are rarely exercised, tenants
are not protected because the borrower, facing loss of the prop-
erty through foreclosure, has little incentive to maintain the
property and comply with lease covenants. On balance, the
lender's interest in seeing that the mortgaged property is oper-
ated and maintained and that tenants do not abandon the
premises should provide the most protection to tenants.
Use of either the mortgagee in possession or the receivership
remedy when the lender's only goal is to collect rents is simply
overkill. These remedies are suitable where the value of the
property itself is at risk because of the borrower's destruction
or waste of the property but not where the borrower is simply
milking the property of its rents. Neither remedy is desirable
supra note 45, at 21 (citing S.H. Cohn Co. v. Simon, 17 Ohio C.C. (n.s.)
371 (1916)).
At least one commentator has suggested that this result is unfair to
the tenant who will have to pay rents to the lender but will not be able
to look to the lender for performance of the landlord's obligations under
the lease. Randolph, supra note 85, at 25-26. Because of the doctrine of
independence of lease covenants, a tenant will generally not be entitled
to withhold rents based on a default in the landlord's obligations. Id. at
26. The tenant's remedy is to sue its landlord, the borrower, for damages
based on breach of the lease covenant unless the landlord's breach is so
serious that it effectively evicts the tenant, in which case the doctrine of
constructive eviction permits the tenant to vacate the premises and stop
paying rent.
This argument overlooks the fact that a lender has more interest
than a borrower after default in seeing that the property is maintained
and that tenants do not abandon the property. Although the lender is
not liable for breaches of lease covenants, the tenant may be better off
than if the borrower is milking the property. Furthermore, the doctrine
of independence of lease covenants has been significantly eroded in the
area of residential tenancies, see Roger A. Cunningham, The New Implied
and Statutory Warranties of Habitability in Residential Leases: From
Contract to Status, 16 URB. L. ANN. 3 (1979), and may be eroding in the
area of commercial tenancies, see Davidow v. Inwood N. Professional
Group-Phase I, 747 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. 1988) (finding an implied
warranty by a commercial landlord that leased premises are suitable for
their intended commercial purpose, which warranty was mutually depen-
dant with the tenant's obligation to pay rent). With regard to those lease
covenants that are mutually dependant, a tenant would be able to with.
hold rent as a result of breaches by the landlord.
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from the viewpoint of either lender or borrower, and even the
interests of a tenant are not better protected if requirements
for activation of an assignment of rents are so onerous that a
lender would rather see rents misapplied than take the risks
attendant with becoming a mortgagee in possession.
B. Less Onerous Requirements
Actions less onerous than taking possession of mortgaged
property or obtaining the appointment of a receiver have in
some states been held sufficient to activate an assignment of
rents. For example, in some states a refused demand for pos-
session has been considered sufficient action to permit a lender
access to rents." In a few states the mere filing of a request
for a receiver, as opposed to the appointment of one, suffices to
activate an assignment of rents." Some states require only
that the lender make demand on the borrower for rents," and
in other states a demand made on tenants to begin paying
rents to the lender has been held sufficient.' The rationale of
87. See, e.g., Freedman's Say. & Trust Co. v. Shepherd, 127 U.S. 494,
502-03 (1888); 1180 Anderson Ave. Realty Corp. v. Mina Equities Corp.,
465 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
88. See, eg., In re Century Inv. Fund VIII Ltd. Partnership, 937 F.2d
371, 377 (7th Cir. 1991); Ryen v. Park Hope Nursing Home, Inc. (In re
Flower City Nursing Home, Inc.), 38 B.R. 642, 645 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.
1984). See also In re Winzenburg, 61 B.R. 141, 143 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa)
(requiring commencement of a foreclosure action and a request for the
appointment of a receiver), affd 1986 WL 21352, at *1 (N.D. Iowa 1986).
But cf Federal Land Bank v. Lower, 421 N.W.2d 126, 129 (Iowa 1988)
(holding a lender entitled to rents accruing between entry of foreclosure
decree and request for appointment of a receiver).
89. See, eg., United States v. Farrell (In re Fluge), 57 B.R. 451, 454
(Bankr. D.N.D. 1985); Bevins v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 671 P.2d 875,
879 (Alaska 1983).
90. See, e.g., Imperial Gardens Liquidating Trust v. Northwest Com-
mons, Inc. (In re Northwest Commons, Inc.), 136 B.R. 215, 218 (Bankr.
E.D. Mo. 1991), criticized in In re Mews Assocs., 144 B.R. 867, 868
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992); Spiotta v. National Grocery Co., 168 A. 159, 160
(N.J. Hudson County Ct. 1933); Skinner v. American State Bank, 189
N.W.2d 665, 666, 670 (N.D. 1971); Randal v. Jersey Mortgage Inv. Co.,
158 A. 865, 866 (Pa. 1932); Grannis-Blair Audit Co. v. Maddux, 69
S.W.2d 238, 239 (Tenn. 1934). See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-
702(B) (1990) (permitting a lender to collect rents "directly from the
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some of the courts permitting activation of an assignment of
rents by these less onerous means is that the required action is
considered the equivalent of the lender's taking possession of
the mortgaged property,91 and if the lender is considered to be
in possession of the property, then the lender might face liabil-
ity as a mortgagee in possession.'
The Restatement has adopted the view that delivery of a
demand for rents to the borrower is the only action required
for a lender to begin collecting rents.' Comments to the rele-
parties obligated for payment"). This is particularly true in title and
intermediate theory states. See Kratovil, supra note 45, at 12.
91. See Northwest Commons, 136 B.R. at 218 (finding that lender's
giving of notices to tenants was equivalent to taking possession); Spiotta,
168 A. at 160 (finding constructive possession where lender had served
notice on tenant demanding payment of rent to lender). See also J.H.
Streiker & Co. v. SeSide Co. (In re SeSide Co.), 152 B.R. 878, 883 (E.D.
Pa. 1993) (classifying a lender's service of demand notices on tenants as
taking constructive possession).
92. But see Strutt v. Ontario Say. & Loan Ass'n, 105 Cal. Rptr. 395,
405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) ("[A lender] who, after default, does no more
than collect rents by means of a letter request to the tenants and who
does not undertake management of the property is [not] a 'mortgagee in
possession.'); Luther P. Stephens Inv. Co. v. Berry Schs., 3 S.E.2d 68, 71
(Ga. 1939) ("[T]he mere fact that the mortgagee receives the rents and
profits does not constitute him a mortgagee in possession, unless he
takes the rent in such a way as to take out of the hands of the mort-
gagor the management and control of the estate.") (quoting 41 C.J. 612, §
580); Ireland v. U.S. Mortgage & Trust Co., 76 N.Y.S. 177, 181-82 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1902) ("[Tihe mere fact that the mortgagee receives the rents
and proceeds does not constitute him chargeable as a mortgagee in pos-
session.") (quoting 20 AM. & ENG. ENC. LAW 1010 (2d ed.)), affd 67 N.E.
1083 (1902). Where property is occupied by tenants, a lender's possession
is not physical possession but the exercise of control over the property;
however, mere collection of rents without otherwise taking over manage-
ment and control of the property should not constitute a lender a mort-
gagee in possession. See Strutt, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 405; Luther P. Stephens
Inv. Co., 3 S.E.2d at 71. See also NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 40, §§
4.25, 4.27, 4.29.
93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SECURITY (MORTGAGES) § 4.2(c)
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1992). Section 4.2(c) provides:
The mortgage may provide that the mortgagee may commence
collection of the rents at any time or, in any event, upon mort-




vant section provide'that collection of rents by a lender in itself
"does not constitute the [lender] a 'mortgagee in possession,'
with the duties and liabilities attendant to that status."9
Therefore, under the Restatement a lender is able to collect
rents from the property without taking possession of the prop-
erty, obtaining the appointment of a receiver, or taking other
onerous action and without taking on the duties and liabilities
of a mortgagee in possession.
ULSIA provides that a lender with an assignment of rents
may, after the borrower's default, give notice to tenants to
make rent payments to the lender without taking possession of
the mortgaged property, and the lender is entitled to those
rents accruing after a tenant's receipt of the notice.95 The
(1) Satisfaction of any conditions in the mortgage; and
(2) Delivery of a demand for the rents to the mortgagor,
the holder of the equity of redemption, and each person who
holds a mortgage on the real property or on its rents of which
the mortgagee has notice.
Id. This approach is adopted in conjunction with the adoption of the lien
theory view that a lender may not take possession of the mortgaged
property prior to foreclosure unless the borrower voluntarily relinquishes
possession or abandons the property. Id. § 4.1. A mortgage provision
giving the lender the right to take possession upon default is unenforce-
able, id. § 4.1(b), and receivership is the remedy available to the lender
for prevention waste of the property, id. § 4.1 cmt. b.
94. Id. § 4.2 cmt. b.
95. U.L.S.I.A. § 505(a), 7A U.L.A. 222 (Supp. 1993). Section 505(a)
provides:
After a debtor's default, a secured creditor in possession of
the real estate and any creditor who has an assignment of rents,
even though not in possession, may notify a lessee to make pay-
ment of the rents to that creditor and, subject to the priority
among creditors specified in this subsection, is entitled to the
rents accruing after the receipt of the notice, except to the ex-
tent that the rents have been paid in good faith either to the
debtor or to a secured creditor entitled thereto under a previous
notice. If more than one secured creditor entitled to rents has
notified the lessee to make payment, the secured creditor in
possession has priority or, if no creditor is in possession, the
secured creditor having priority of security interest has priority
as to rents. If requested in writing by the lessee, the secured
creditor, within ten days after the request is received, shall fur-
nish reasonable proof as to the secured creditor's right to rents.
The lessee need not perform to the secured creditor until the
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comments to this section provide that a lender collecting rents
is not considered to be in constructive possession of the proper-
ty and therefore has no obligation to operate or maintain the
property." The lender must apply rents collected to reduce
the debt but may release all or part of the rents to the borrow-
er to be applied to operating expenses.' Therefore, ULSIA
provides a method whereby the lender can collect rents with-
out taking possession of the property or obtaining the appoint-
ment of a receiver98 and also provides guidance as to a means
for allowing the continued operation and maintenance by the
borrower.
The ULSIA and Restatement approaches to the treatment of
the assignment of rents give the lender a realistic means of
enforcing a security interest in rents. If the borrower agrees to
grant a security interest in rents, there should be some reason-
able means of enforcing it in the absence of specific document
provisions requiring more onerous action. Requiring that a
lender take possession of the mortgaged property or obtain the
appointment of a receiver in order to collect rents from the
property is simply unnecessary where there is no waste of the
property. Because of the lender's interest in the continued
operation and maintenance of the property, a lender in control
of rents will in many cases release some portion of the rents to
the borrower for the borrower's use in operating and maintain-
proof is furnished. The lessee need not perform to the debtor or
any secured creditor who had previously given notice until the
time for furnishing the proof has expired.
IC-
96. Id. § 505(a) cmt. 2.
97. Id. Even this, however, might be sufficient participation in man-
agement by a lender to leave the lender open to liability under CERCLA.
See supra note 77.
98. ULSIA encourages use of the mortgagee in possession remedy by
protecting lenders to some extent from liabilities to which they would
otherwise be subject, U.L.S.I.A. § 505, but permits a lender to collect
rents without taking possession, id. § 505(a). ULSIA attempts to confine
the remedy of appointment of a receiver to the unusual case where pos-
session by the lender would not adequately protect the property. See id.
§ 504 cmt. 1. This can be contrasted with the Restatement approach
which prohibits the mortgagee in possession remedy and provides for
receivership as the primary means for protecting a lender against waste.
See supra note 93.
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ing the property." This scenario may provide the best of both
worlds for borrower and lender since the lender may control
rents without the risks of receivership or liability as a mort-
gagee in possession and the borrower may retain control over
the property and its management.
C. The Absolute Assignment of Rents
A borrower and lender may agree that an assignment of
rents should give the lender access to rents immediately upon
default by the borrower without the requirement of prior acti-
vation. To achieve this goal the borrower may execute an abso-
lute assignment of rents,"c which some courts have recog-
nized as being effective."1 Where the activation requirement
99. See, e.g., Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Atrium Dev. Co. (In re
Atrium Dev. Co.), 159 B.R. 464, 467 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993).
100. An absolute assignment may take on any number of forms ranging
from an assignment which by its terms permits the lender access to
rents immediately upon default without any other action on the part of
the lender, to an assignment which purports to be an outright transfer to
the lender of the right to rents with a license back to, or other right in,
the borrower to collect rents until the occurrence of a default. In some
cases a borrower will execute an absolute assignment that gives the
lender the right to collect rents for application to the indebtedness from
the date of execution of the assignment forward. This last type of assign-
ment is generally enforced in accordance with its terms but is rare since
most borrowers want to retain control over the collection of rents at least
until the occurrence of a default.
101. See, e.g., FDIC v. International Property Management, Inc., 929
F.2d 1033, 1035-36 (5th Cir. 1991); Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. Co. v.
Williams (In re O'Neill Enters.), 506 F.2d 1242, 1243 (4th Cir. 1974);
Great W. Life Assurance Co. v. Rothman (In re Ventura-Louise Proper-
ties), 490 F.2d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 1974). See also Kinnison v. Guaranty
Liquidating Corp., 115 P.2d 450, 453 (Cal. 1941); Taylor v. Brennan, 621
S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex. 1981).
A number of jurisdictions do not recognize an absolute assignment
of rents made in connection with a mortgage loan. See In re Century
Inv. Fund VIII Ltd. Partnership, 937 F.2d 371, 377 (7th Cir. 1991) (Wis-
consin law); Investor Syndicate v. Smith, 105 F.2d 611, 620 (9th Cir.
1939) (Oregon law); Glessner v. Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re
Glessner), 140 B.R. 556, 561 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1992); Drummond v. Farm
Credit Bank (In re Kurth Ranch), 110 B.R. 501, 506 (Bankr. D. Mont.
1990); In re Multi-Group III Ltd. Partnership, 99 B.R. 5, 9 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 1989); In re Association Ctr. Ltd. Partnership, 87 B.R. 142, 145
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is eliminated, the lender may begin collecting rents upon the
borrower's default without first taking any onerous action
which would otherwise be required."2 Further, the lender
has the right to rents collected by the borrower or other parties
after default.'
The case traditionally cited for the concept of the absolute
assignment is Kinnison v. Guaranty Liquidating Corpora-
tion." Because the borrower in Kinnison was to collect rent-
al income for the account of the lender from the date of the
execution of the agreement forward,"5 the case did not in-
volve an absolute assignment of rents to take effect upon de-
fault. However, the court did discuss the validity of an assign-
ment of rents which provides "that in the event of default the
rents are assigned absolutely to the mortgagee."' The court
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1988).
102. See Equitable Mortgage Co. v. Fishman (In re Charles D. Stapp of
Nov., Inc.), 641 F.2d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 1981); Kinnison, 115 P.2d at 453;
Taylor, 621 S.W.2d at 594. But see In re GOCO Realty Fund I, 151 B.R.
241 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1993), in which a bankruptcy court addressed the
issue of a lender's right to retainers held by law firms paid out of post-
default rents where the lender held an absolute assignment of rents. The
court held that the lender did not have an interest in the rents because
the lender had not taken any action to enforce its assignment of rents
after the borrower's default. Id. at 249. The court interpreted Cal. Civ.
Code § 2938, the California statute governing absolute assignments, to
require a lender to take an "enforcement step" in order to be entitled to
rents on the basis that "[any other interpretation will only lead to confu-
sion in the market place by leaving open to question entitlement to mon-
ies commingled or transferred to third parties." Id. at 248. This result
may be wrong since it would mean no difference at all under California
law in treatment of an absolute assignment of rents and a collateral
assignment of rents although California statute provides explicitly for
both. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2938 (West Supp. 1993). As an alternative basis
for its holding, the court found that the lender had 'failed to meet its
burden of tracing the proceeds" of the rents to the retainers. In re GOCO
Realty Fund I, 151 B.R. at 250.
103. See International Property Management, 929 F.2d at 1034; O'Neill
Enters., 506 F.2d at 1244; Ventura-Louise Properties, 490 F.2d at 1145.
104. 115 P.2d 450 (Cal. 1941). Although California cases are often cited
for the common law doctrine of the absolute assignment, California has
recently codified its recognition of the absolute assignment. See CAL. CIV.
CODE § 2938(a) (West 1993).
105. Kinnison, 115 P.2d at 452.
106. Id at 453.
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in Kinnison distinguished between a provision "pledging the
rents as additional security" and a provision which "operates to
transfer to the mortgagee the mortgagor's right to the rentals
upon the happening of the specified condition."0 7 The court
held that the assignment of rents involved in that case did not
transfer a security interest in rents but was a "complete trans-
fer of [the borrower's] interest in rentals."
1°8
A number of courts have stated that an absolute assignment
of rents is one which transfers title to or ownership of the
rents to the lender,'" while other courts have recognized that
an absolute assignment is intended merely for security."
Treating an absolute assignment as a transfer of title to rents
is a legal fiction"' because a mortgage lender has not pur-
107. Idc
108. Id. at 454.
109. See, e.g., Great W. Life Assurance Co. v. Rothman (In re Ventura-
Louise Properties), 490 F.2d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 1974) ("by assignment,
title is transferred") (quoting Paramount Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Sacks,
152 A. 457, 458 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. Div. 1930)); In re Salem Plaza
Assocs., 135 B.R. 753, 756 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (absolute assignment
"upon default, divests the [borrower] of every interest in the rents");
Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex. 1981) (absolute assignment
"passes title to the rents*).
110. See, eg., FDIC v. International Property Management, Inc., 929
F.2d 1033, 1035 (5th Cir. 1991); 500 Ygnacio Assocs. v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co. (In re 500 Ygnacio Assocs.), 141 B.R. 191, 195-96 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
1992); In re Bethesda Air Rights Ltd. Partnership, 117 B.R. 202, 206
(Bankr. D. Md. 1990); Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Winslow Ctr.
Assocs. (In re Winslow Ctr. Assocs.), 50 B.R. 679, 681 n.2 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1985).
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has characterized the absolute
assignment as follows:
The assignment here is "absolute" in the sense that it was
effective upon default without further action by the credi-
tor . . . . "Absolute* does not mean, however, that the assignee
is relieved of all obligation to account or that the right to the
rents is independent of the underlying debt. Upon foreclosure,
the creditor, of course, must account for any excess derived from
the sale and rents collected between the date of default and the
date of foreclosure sale over and above the amount of the obliga-
tion owed.
Equitable Mortgage Co. v. Fishman (In re Charles D. Stapp of Nev.,
Inc.), 641 F.2d 739, 740 (9th Cir. 1981).
111. See Randolph, supra note 27, at 290.
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chased the rents but is merely attempting to get a security
interest with attributes different from the traditional collateral
assignment of rents."' If the lender were truly purchasing
the rents, then the lender would give some consideration for
the purchase, such as a reduction in the debt by an amount
equal to the present value of the future rental stream. Instead,
rents collected by a lender are applied to the indebtedness only
as and to the extent collected. In addition, it is the borrower
who retains the risk of default by the tenants under their leas-
es, and this would not generally be the case if the rents were
sold. Finally, a true purchase of the rents would not terminate
on the final repayment of the indebtedness as does an assign-
ment of rents made in connection with a mortgage loan."'
Courts have been reluctant in most cases to find that a bor-
rower and lender intended an absolute assignment and there-
fore have required that the intent of the parties to create an
absolute assignment be very clearly expressed."1 Language
in an assignment of rents that the lender must take some
action after default in order to collect rents has been held fatal
to the finding of an absolute assignment.115 More important-
ly, if an assignment of rents provides that it is given as securi-
ty for the mortgage debt, courts generally hold that it is not an
absolute assignment.116 This elevation of form over substance
112. The author will use the term "collateral assignment of rents" to
distinguish the traditional assignment of rents from the "absolute assign-
ment" where that distinction is necessary.
113. See 500 Ygnacio Assocs., 141 B.R. at 195. Although unlikely, it is
of course possible that a lender could purchase its borrower's rents, re-
ducing the indebtedness by an amount equal to the value of the rental
stream and taking the risk of collection of the rent and defaults by the
tenants. Such a purchase would probably be of rents under specific leases
and would terminate when the terms of the assigned leases had expired
rather than when the borrower's indebtedness to the lender was repaid.
114. See FDIC v. International Property Management, Inc., 929 F.2d
1033, 1038 (5th Cir. 1991); Childs Real Estate Co. v. Shelburne Realty
Co., 143 P.2d 697, 700 (Cal. 1943).
115. See, e.g., In re 1301 Connecticut Ave. Assocs., 117 B.R. 2, 7
(Bankr. D.D.C. 1990), aft'd, 126 B.R. 1 (D.D.C. 1991); Taylor v. Brennan,
621 S.W.2d 592, 594-95 (Tex. 1981).
116. See, e.g., 1301 Connecticut Ave. Assocs., 117 B.R. at 7; In re Asso-
ciation Ctr. Ltd. Partnership, 87 B.R. 142, 145 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.
1988); Taylor, 621 S.W.2d at 594-95. But see In re Galvin, 120 B.R. 767,
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has created a drafting nightmare for lenders and their attor-
neys attempting to secure a loan with an absolute assignment
that passes title to the rents upon default and is not "security"
for the loan.
Lenders persist in their attempts to create absolute assign-
ments because the advantages to a lender of an absolute as-
signment are clear. First, the lender is entitled to collect rents
without activating the assignment of rents.11 In states where
some minimal action such as serving notice on-the borrower or
on the tenants is all that is required for activation, this advan-
tage is not so important, but in states requiring more onerous
actions such as taking possession of the property or obtaining
the appointment of a receiver, the advantage is great. 8 Sec-
ond, under an absolute assignment the lender is entitled to
rents collected by the borrower or another party after the oc-
currence of a default. 9 This is in contrast to the traditional
771-72 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1990) (finding an absolute assignment based on
intent of the parties despite language in the assignment that it was
given to secure the debt). Even in FDIC v. International Property Man-
agement, Inc., where the Fifth Circuit recognized that all assignments of
rents made in connection with a mortgage loan are undoubtedly made to
secure the debt, the court stressed the fact that the assignment in that
case did not use the words "security" or "pledge" in holding that it was
an absolute assignment. 929 F.2d at 1038.
117. See Equitable Mortgage Co. v. Fishman (In re Charles D. Stapp of
Nev., Inc.), 641 F.2d 739, 740 (9th Cir. 1981); Kinnison v. Guaranty
Liquidating Corp., 115 P.2d 450, 453 (Cal. 1941); Taylor, 621 S.W.2d at
594. But see In re GOCO Realty Fund I, 151 B.R. 241, 248 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. 1993) (holding that activation is required even with an absolute as-
signment).
118. See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the disadvantages to a lender of taking possession of property or seeking
the appointment of a receiver.
119. See FDIC v. International Property Management, Inc., 929 F.2d
1033, 1034 (5th Cir. 1991); Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Williams (In
re O'Neill Enters.), 506 F.2d 1242, 1244 (4th Cir. 1974); Great W. Life
Assurance Co. v. Rothman (In re Ventura-Louise Properties), 490 F.2d
1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 1974). A number of cases involving assignments of
rents have been contests between the lender holding the assignment and
another creditor of the borrower. See, e.g., Jim Davis & Co. v. Albuquer-
que Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 536 So. 2d 55, 57 (Ala. 1988) (involving
contest between mortgage lender and judgment creditor with writ of
garnishment over rents accruing after lender purchased at foreclosure
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assignment of rents which gives a lender the right only to
those rents accruing after activation."2 Finally, the advan-
tages to a lender of the absolute assignment arising in the
bankruptcy context will be discussed below.'2'
Where a lender has succeeded in drafting an assignment of
rents that a court will construe as an absolute assignment,
there may be some problems caused by the finding of an abso-
lute assignment. Several courts have focused unduly on the
discussion of an absolute assignment as a transfer of owner-
ship of the rents," 2 and the logical extension of treating an
absolute assignment as a sale of the rents is the assumption
that the lender must have paid a purchase price in the form of
a reduction in the amount of the debt owed by the borrower by
an amount equal to the present value of the rental stream.' 2
sale); Innison, 115 P.2d at 452 (involving contest between mortgage
lender and execution creditor over rents collected by the borrower and
deposited in a bank account in the borrower's name). Where the assign-
ment of rents is absolute, the lender wins the contest. See id. at 454.
120. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
122. In the case of In re Fry Road Assocs., 64 B.R. 808 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1986), a bankruptcy court held that a lender owned the rents cov-
ered by an absolute assignment, and the borrower no longer had any
interest in them. The court said that an absolute assignment "operates to
transfer the right to rentals automatically upon the happening of a speci-
fied condition such as default .... The assignment does not create a
security interest but instead passes title to the rents. . . ." Id. at 809
(quoting Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex. 1981)) (citations
omitted).
It should be noted that the Fifth Circuit later recognized that an
absolute assignment is in fact made for security purposes and is only a
legal fiction intended to circumvent the requirement of activation of an
assignment of rents. See FDIC v. International Property Management,
Inc., 929 F.2d 1033, 1035 (5th Cir. 1991).
123. The court in Fry Road stated that [i]f title was transferred, a
portion of the debt . . . has obviously been discharged or paid pro tanto."
Fry Road, 64 B.R. at 809 n.1 (citing Taylor, 621 S.W.2d at 594) (cita-
tions omitted). The court apparently was confused by the meaning of the
term "pro tanto" as it had been used by courts in discussing the absolute
assignment of rents. See, e.g., Malsman v. Brandler, 41 Cal. Rptr. 438,
440 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), cited in Taylor, 621 S.W.2d at 594. The
term means "for so much" or "as far as it goes." BLACK'S LAW DICTIO-
NARY 1222 (6th ed. 1990); BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN
LEGAL USAGE 444-45 (1987). See also Donley v. Hays, 17 Serg. & Rawle
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However, because the borrower and lender would not have
intended a sale of. the rents and would not therefore have
agreed to the amount of the debt reduction, a court or a jury
might have to determine that amount. Furthermore, if a lender
charges or collects interest on the "pre-reduction" principal
amount after rents have been assigned, the lender risks the
imposition of usury penalties.1" Finally, the absolute assign-
ment has caused confusion in bankruptcy as will be discussed
below.'
The fictional transfer of rents by absolute assignment was
an unfortunate step taken by lenders and courts in order to
avoid some of the pitfalls of the collateral assignment of
rents.26 The undue focus on the absolute assignment as pass-
ing title to rents has made drafting such an assignment all but
impossible and has led to confusion over whether the absolute
assignment effects a sale of the rental stream or merely cre-
ates a security interest. For these reasons, the concept of the
absolute assignment should be eliminated, but the parties'
intent that the lender have control over rents without activa-
tion should be attainable by a more straightforward method as
would be the case if rents were covered by Article 9 of the
UcC.
400 (Pa. 1828) (contrasting the terms "pro tanto" and "pro rata"). In the
context of assignments of rents, the term should mean that rents collect-
ed by a lender are applied to reduce the debt as, and to the extent,
actually received by the lender. This interpretation of the term would be
consistent with the fact that an assignment of rents, even an absolute
assignment, is truly a security interest in the rents rather than a sale of
the rents.
124. See Richard E. Danley & Andrew E. Jillson, Absolute Assignments
of Leases and Rents: Has the Unicorn Been Found or Is It Still Myth, 30
REAL EST., PROB. & TR. L. REP., Apr. 1992, at 28, 32.
125. See infra notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
126. The Taylor court, for example, could have adopted the straightfor-
ward approach that the right to rents would pass to the lender automati-
cally upon a default where the parties had sufficiently manifested their




IV. ASSIGNMENTS OF RENTS IN THE BANKRUpTCY CONTEXT
A. The Effect of Bankruptcy in General
Most of the recent cases involving assignments of rents, both
collateral and absolute, have been bankruptcy cases, so it is
important to review the treatment of assignments of rents in
the bankruptcy context. The bankruptcy of a borrower will
materially affect a mortgage lender's rights under its mortgage
and assignment of rents, one of the primary effects being de-
lay."2 Once a borrower has filed a petition in bankruptcy, the
lender is stayed from foreclosing on the mortgaged property
despite any pre-petition default or the continuing failure of the
borrower to make payments on the loan." 8 In a Chapter 7
bankruptcy the trustee will ultimately liquidate the mortgaged
property to pay the mortgage lender and other creditors"2 or
if there is no equity in the property, may abandon it so that
the mortgage lender can foreclose."3 In a Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy"3 ' the borrower hopes that a plan of reorganization
will ultimately be confirmed," at which time the mortgage
lender will begin receiving payments on its debt under the
terms of the plan. However, the time period between filing of a
petition under Chapter 11 and confirmation of a plan can be
substantial."
127. See 1991 Senate Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 12, at 88-89
(statement of Mary Jane Flaherty on behalf of the American Council of
Life Insurance), 186-87 (statement of James W. Nelson on behalf of the
Mortgage Bankers Association of America). Mr. Nelson estimated annual
losses to mortgage lenders caused by delays resulting from bankruptcies
of single asset real estate entities at $1.7 billion. Id. at 187.
128. BANKRUPTCY CODE, 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
129. I& §§ 704(1), 726.
130. Id. § 554.
131. Issues regarding rents could theoretically arise in a Chapter 13
bankruptcy also. Most often, however, the issues arise in Chapter 11 and
involve a single-asset entity. See 1991 Senate Subcomm. Hearing, supra
note 12, at 88-89 (statement of Mary Jane Flaherty on behalf of the
American Council of Life Insurance), 185-87 (statement of James W.
Nelson on behalf of the Mortgage Bankers Association of America).
132. If a plan is not ultimately confirmed, the bankruptcy will be dis-
missed or converted to a Chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (b)(2) (1988).
133. The debtor has the exclusive right to file a plan of reorganization
for 120 days. Id. § 1121(b). That period may be extended at the request
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During the period of time between the filing of bankruptcy
and the ultimate foreclosure or liquidation of the property in
Chapter 7 or commencement of payments under a Chapter 11
plan, rents continue to accrue from the mortgaged property.
*The bankruptcy trustee or borrower, as debtor in possession,
and the lender have conflicting interests in the treatment of
the rents collected during the pendency of the bankruptcy. The
bankruptcy trustee is charged with collecting and liquidating
property of the estate"M and therefore wants the accrued
rents to remain in the estate for payment of unsecured claims.
The borrower in Chapter 11 wants to use rents in furtherance
of his anticipated plan of reorganization because a reorganiza-
tion will be impossible unless rents are available for the con-
tinued operation of the property and because excess rents may
be used for payment of other expenses including attorneys'
fees. The lender, on the other hand, wants rents to be applied
only to operation and maintenance of the property and to pay-
ment of interest accruing on the debt. If excess rents are not
applied to accruing interest, the increasing loan balance caused
by unpaid interest can, in the case of an oversecured lender,
quickly overtake any equity cushion that the lender may have
in the property. Similarly, in the case of an undersecured lend-
er, it can increase the unsecured portion of the loan, only a
small percentage of which may ever be paid. These parties'
conflicting interests in the application of rents in the bankrupt-
cy have led to the litigation of a number of cases on the effect
of an assignment of rents in bankruptcy. "
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of the
treatment of an assignment of rents in bankruptcy in Butner v.
United States." The Court held in Butner that state law gov-
erns "property rights in the assets of a bankrupt's estate,"
including the rights of a lender under an assignment of
rents. The Court rejected the view that had been adopted
of the debtor. See id. § 1121(d). Confirmation of a plan occurs after no-
tice and a hearing. Id. § 1128(a).
134. Id. § 704(1).
135. See supra note 21.
136. 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
137. Butner, 440 U.S. at 54-55. The Court reasoned as follows:
Property interests are created and defined by state law.
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by the Third and Seventh Circuits that "federal law affords
mortgagees an automatic security interest in rents and profits
when state law would deny such an automatic benefit and
require the mortgagee to take some affirmative action before
his rights are recognized."" Instead, the Court decided that
bankruptcy courts should "take whatever steps are necessary
to ensure that the mortgagee is afforded in federal bankruptcy
court the same protection he would have under state law if no
bankruptcy had ensued." 9 The difficulty has come in imple-
menting the Court's pronouncement that the lender be given
the same protection in bankruptcy that it would have under
state law because state law is so confusing.
B. Bankruptcy Treatment of the Unactivated Collateral
Assignment of Rents
Where a lender has not activated its assignment of rents
prior to the borrower's bankruptcy filing, it is clear that the
lender may not take steps outside of the bankruptcy court to
begin collecting rents without seeking relief from the automatic
stay.4 ° Any action such as taking possession of the mort-
gaged property, seeking the appointment of a receiver in state
court, or even sending notices to tenants to begin making rent
payments to the lender would violate the automatic stay."
1
Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is
no reason why such interests should be analyzed differently sim-
ply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. Uniform treatment of property interests by both state
and federal courts within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to
discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a party from receiving
"a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy."
Lewis v. Manufacturers National Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 ....
The justifications for application of state law are not limited to
ownership interests; they apply with equal force to security inter-
ests, including the interest of a mortgagee in rents earned by
mortgaged property.
Butner, 440 U.S. at 54-55.
138. Id at 56.
139. Id.
140. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
141. Id. See also In re Multi-Group III Ltd. Partnership, 99 B.R. 5, 8
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 1989) (actions taken to collect rents pursuant to Arizona
[Vol.46:349386
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Therefore, the borrower, as debtor in possession, or the bank-
ruptcy trustee is entitled to continue collecting rents. The re-
spective rights of the borrower and the lender to rents collected
from the mortgaged property depend upon whether rents cov-
ered by an unactivated collateral assignment of rents are con-
sidered cash collateral. Cash collateral is defined by the Bank-
ruptcy Code as "cash... in which the estate and an entity
other than the estate have an interest and includes the pro-
ceeds, products, offspring, rents, or profits of property subject
to a security interest as provided in section 552(b) of this ti-
If rents are not considered cash collateral, they are available
for distribution to unsecured creditors in the case of a Chapter
7 bankruptcy or for use by the debtor in possession in the case
of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.14 1 Where rents are treated as
statute violate automatic stay); In re Mears, 88 B.R. 419, 421 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1988) (automatic stay prohibits lender from seeking sequestra-
tion order, possession of mortgaged property, or appointment of receiver
in state court); In re Prichard Plaza Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 84 B.R.
289, 302 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988) (lender's collection of rents post-petition
violated automatic stay).
142. 11 U.S.C. § 363(a). Section 552(b) provides:
Except as provided in sections 363, 506(c), 522, 544, 545,
547, and 548 of this title, if the debtor and an entity entered
into a security agreement before the commencement of the case
and if the security interest created by such security agreement
extends to property of the debtor acquired before the commence-
ment of the case and to proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or
profits of such property, then such security interest extends to
such proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits acquired by the
estate after the commencement of the case to the extent provided
by such security agreement and by applicable non-bankruptcy
law, except to any extent that the court, after notice and a hear-
ing and based on the equities of the case, orders otherwise.
Id. § 552(b).
Under § 552(a), property acquired by the bankruptcy estate after
the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding is not subject to any
pre-petition lien; therefore, after-acquired property provisions of a security
agreement are not enforced in bankruptcy. Id. § 552(a). Section 552(b)
provides an exception to the lien avoidance mechanism of section 552(a)
for "proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits" of property covered by
a pre-petition security interest. IU § 552(b).
143. Rents may be used by the borrower in Chapter 11 "to fund his
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cash collateral, the debtor is not entitled to use them without
consent of the lender or authorization of the bankruptcy
court.'" The bankruptcy court may not authorize the use of
cash collateral unless the lender is adequately protected,"
but courts usually permit the borrower to use rents for the
operation and maintenance of the mortgaged property because
such use provides adequate protection to the lender by preserv-
ing the value of the property."'4 The court may require that
excess rents be sequestered or paid to the lender for applica-
tion against the indebtedness. In fact, the borrower and lender
often will enter into an agreed order, the effect of which is to
permit the borrower to use some portion of the rents for opera-
tion and maintenance of the property and to give the lender
the remainder of the rents for application against the indebted-
ness.
The courts are split on the issue of whether rents covered by
an unactivated collateral assignment of rents should be treated
as cash collateral. Some courts have held that such rents are
not cash collateral."7 The reasoning of most of these courts is
legal bill, continue his lifestyle, or for other purposes." 1991 Senate
Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 12, at 218 (statement of William L.
Norton III on behalf of the American Bankers Association). But see In re
Association Ctr. Ltd. Partnership, 87 B.R. 142, 147 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.
1988), in which the court said the following with regard to the use of
rents collected by the borrower.
The debtor-in-possession which has fiduciary and accounting
responsibilities to all of its creditors . . . is now collecting the
rents. It is obviously to the best interest of all parties that the
rents be properly utilized to pay for the operation of the build-
ing, overhead, maintenance, insurance, taxes and the like . ...
[r1f the rents are being dissipated and/or used for improper pur-
poses, the situation can always be brought before the
Court ....
Id.
144. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2).
145. Id. § 363(e).
146. See Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Atrium Dev. Co. (In re Atrium
Dev. Co.), 159 B.R. 464, 471 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993); In re Prichard Pla-
za Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 84 B.R. 289, 301-02 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988);
Chaussee v. Morning Star Ranch Resorts Co. (In re Morning Star Ranch
Resorts), 64 B.R. 818, 823 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986).
147. See, e.g., Glessner v. Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re
Glessner), 140 B.R. 556, 562 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1992), overruled by KAN.
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based upon their equating the activation required by state law
with "perfection."1 48 The Bankruptcy Code permits a trustee
in bankruptcy to avoid unperfected security interests,49 and
STAT. ANN. § 58-2343 (Supp. 1992); Drummond v. Farm Credit Bank (In
re Kurth Ranch), 110 B.R. 501, 505 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990); In re Multi-
Group III Ltd. Partnership, 99 B.R. 5 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1989); In re TM
Carlton House Partners, Ltd., 91 B.R. 349, 355-56 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1988); Association Ctr., 87 B.R. at 145, overruled by WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 7.28.230(3) (West 1992); Prichard Plaza, 84 B.R. at 293-94; In re
Hamlin's Landing Joint Venture, 77 B.R. 916, 920 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1987), overruled by FLA. STAT. ANN. § 697.07 (West Supp. 1993); Ex-
change Nat'l Bank v. Gotta (In re Gotta), 47 B.R. 198, 204 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. 1985).
148. See Glessner, 140 B.R. at 558; Kurth Ranch, 110 B.R. at 506;
Multi-Group, 99 B.R. at 8; Association Ctr., 87 B.R. at 145; Hamlin's
Landing, 77 B.R. at 920-21. The court in Prichard Plaza used a slightly
different rationale. The court recognized that the assignment of rents had
been perfected by recordation but held that the rents were not cash
collateral because the lender's security interest in the rents was inchoate
since the lender had not activated its assignment of rents by taking
possession of the mortgaged property. Prichard Plaza, 84 B.R. at 298,
301-02.
149. The power to avoid unperfected security interests arises pursuant
to § 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code which provides:
The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the
case, and without regard to any knowledge of the trustee or of
any creditor, the rights and powers of, or may avoid any transfer
of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor
that is voidable by -
(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time
of the commencement of the case, and that obtains, at such time
and with respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all property on
which a creditor on a simple contract could have obtained such a
judicial lien, whether or not such a creditor exists;
(2) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time
of the commencement of the case, and obtains, at such time and
with respect to such credit, an execution against the debtor that
is returned unsatisfied at such time, whether or not such a cred-
itor exists; or
(3) a bona fide purchaser of real property, other than fix-
tures, from the debtor, against whom applicable law permits such
transfer to be perfected, that obtains the status of a bona fide
purchaser and has perfected such transfer at the time of the
commencement of the case, whether or not such a purchaser
exists.
11 U.S.C. § 544(a).
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these courts have reasoned that an unactivated assignment of
rents is an unperfected security interest in rents that can be
avoided by the trustee in bankruptcy. 5° If the trustee can
avoid a lender's interest in the rents because it is unperfected,
then only the bankruptcy estate has an interest in the rents,
and they are not cash collateral."'
Other courts have held that a lender with an unactivated
assignment of rents can take actions in the bankruptcy court
that are the equivalent of the actions required for activation
under state law. 52 Most of these courts, like those espousing
the view discussed above, equate activation of an assignment
with perfection. These courts, however, find that an
unactivated assignment of rents falls within a narrow excep-
tion to the trustee's avoidance power that permits post-petition
perfection." The equivalent action which can be taken in the
bankruptcy court is the filing by the lender of a notice under
section 546(b) of the Bankruptcy Code."u The filing of such a
150. See Glessner, 140 B.R. at 561; Kurth Ranch, 110 B.R. at 507-08;
Association Ctr., 87 B.R. at 146.
151. The definition of cash collateral includes "rents . . . subject to a
security interest as provided in § 552(b) . . . .. 11 U.S.C. § 363(a). Sec-
tion 552(b) is expressly made subject to § 554 which gives the trustee
the power to avoid unperfected security interests. Id. §§ 554, 552(b).
152. See, e.g., Casbeer v. State Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Casbeer),
793 F.2d 1436, 1443 (5th Cir. 1986); Wolters Village, Ltd. v. Village
Properties, Ltd. (In re Village Properties, Ltd.), 723 F.2d 441, 444 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984); McCombs Properties VI, Ltd. v.
First Texas Say. Ass'n (In re McCombs Properties VI, Ltd.), 88 B.R. 261,
264 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988); In re Mears, 88 B.R. at 421; In re Gelwicks,
81 B.R. 445, 447-48 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987); FDIC v. Lancaster (In re
Sampson), 57 B.R. 304, 307, 309 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986); United States
v. Farrell (In re Fluge), 57 B.R. 451, 456-57 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985); Con-
solidated Capital Income Trust v. Colter, Inc. (In re Consolidated Capital
Income Trust), 47 B.R. 1008, 1011 (D. Colo. 1985). See also Saline State
Bank v. Mahloch, 834 F.2d 690, 696 (8th Cir. 1987); Waldron v. North-
west Acceptance Corp. (In re Johnson), 62 B.R. 24, 29 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1986).
153. See Casbeer, 793 F.2d at 1443; McCombs, 88 B.R. at 264; Mears,
88 B.R. at 421; Gelwicks, 81 B.R. at 448; Sampson, 57 B.R. at 307;
Fluge, 57 B.R. at 457; Consolidated Capital, 47 B.R. at 1011.
154. Section 546(b) provides:
The rights and powers of a trustee under sections 544, 545,
and 549 of this title are subject to any generally applicable law
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notice constitutes a post-petition perfection of the interest in
rents."' If the interest in rents is perfected, it cannot be avoid-
ed by the bankruptcy trustee; therefore, any rents collected
after the filing of the section 546(b) notice are considered cash
collateral.1'
Finally, a recent trend in a number of courts has been to
recognize that a properly recorded assignment of rents is per-
fected and is therefore not subject to avoidance by the trustee
in bankruptcy.'57 These courts have treated the activation re-
that permits perfection of an interest in property to be effective
against an entity that acquires rights in such property before the
date of such perfection. If such law requires seizure of such
property or commencement of an action to accomplish such per-
fection, and such property has not been seized or such action has
not been commenced before the date of the filing of the petition,
such interest in such property shall be perfected by notice within
the time fixed by such law for such seizure or commencement.
11 U.S.C. § 546(b).
155. See Casbeer, 793 F.2d at 1443; McCombs, 88 B.R. at 264; Mears,
88 B.R. at 421; Gelwicks, 81 B.R. at 448; Sampson, 57 B.R. at 307, 309;
Fluge, 57 B.R. at 454, 456-57; Consolidated Capital, 47 B.R. at 1011.
156. See Casbeer, 793 F.2d at 1443-44; McCombs, 88 B.R. at 264;
Sampson, 57 B.R. at 309; Consolidated Capital, 47 B.R. at 1011-12. A
student may have first suggested the approach taken by these courts in
his comment in THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL. See Randy Rogers, Com-
ment, Assignment of Rents Clauses under California Law and in Bank-
ruptcy: Strategy for the Secured Creditor, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1433 (1980).
Courts and commentators have since criticized this approach on the basis
that legislative history indicates § 546(b) was intended to apply only
where a particular statute authorizes relation back to the time of perfec-
tion. See In re Association Ctr. Ltd. Partnership, 87 B.R. 142, 146
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1988); In re Prichard Plaza Assocs. Ltd. Partnership,
84 B.R. 289, 300-01 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988); Averch, supra note 27, at
523; McCafferty, supra note 27, at 464. For example, § 546(b) would
clearly apply to the post-petition perfection of a purchase money security
interest which is perfected within ten days after the purchaser receives
possession of the collateral under UCC § 9-301(2). See McCafferty, supra
note 27, at 463 n.148.
157. See, e.g., Steinberg v. CrossLand Mortgage Corp. (In re Park at
Dash Point L.P.), 985 F.2d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 1993); Vienna Park Prop-
erties v. United Postal Say. Ass'n (In re Vienna Park Properties), 976
F.2d 106, 112-15 (2d Cir. 1992); J.H. Streiker & Co. v. SeSide Co. (In re
SeSide Co.), 152 B.R. 878, 884-85 (E.D. Pa. 1993); In re. Northport Mari-
na Assocs., 136 B.R. 911, 917-18 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992); In re White
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quired under state law as being more akin to enforcement of
the security interest in rents than to perfection and have held
that an assignment of rents is perfected by recordation in the
real property records.'" Therefore, if a lender has a properly
recorded assignment of rents, rents collected by the debtor are
cash collateral. 59
The different treatments given assignments of rents by the
various federal courts are dependant to some extent on their
different interpretations of bankruptcy law and to some extent
on their interpretations of the law of the applicable state. Os-
tensibly, differences in state law account for the fact that some
courts have treated activation as being equivalent to perfection
while others have treated a properly recorded but unactivated
assignment of rents as being perfected. Very few state courts
have used the term "perfection" in reference to the activation
of an assignment of rents,"6 but where the term has been so
used, it probably has a different meaning from that used in
Article 9 of the UCC and likely contemplated by bankruptcy
law. The essence of perfection as used in Article 9, and proba-
bly in the Bankruptcy Code, is that it gives constructive notice
to third parties of a security interest or lien and thus is the
event that makes a security interest good as against third
parties.' s' With regard to an assignment of rents, the recor-
Plains Dev. Corp., 136 B.R. 93; 95 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re
Rancourt, 123 B.R. 143, 147 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991); In re Somero, 122
B.R. 634, 638-39 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991); In re Raleigh/Spring Forest Apts.
Assocs., 118 B.R. 42, 45 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1990); Northwestern Natl Life
Ins. Co. v. Metro Square (In re Metro Square), 106 B.R. 584, 587 (D.
Minn. 1989).
158. See Steinberg, 985 F.2d at 1011; Vienna Park, 976 F.2d at 112-13;
SeSide, 152 B.R. at 884-85; White Plains, 136 B.R. at 95; Metro Square,
106 B.R. at 587-88.
159. See Vienna Park, 976 F.2d at 114; SeSide, 152 B.R. at 885; Metro
Square, 106 B.R. at 588.
160. See, e.g., Kinnison v. Guaranty Liquidating Corp., 115 P.2d 450,
453 (Cal. 1941). But cf Jim Davis & Co. v. Albuquerque Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 536 So. 2d 55, 60 (Ala. 1988) (notice to tenants was not
necessary to perfect a lender's right to rents).
161. See SeSide, 152 B.R. at 884-85. Depending upon the type of collat-
eral and which state's law governs the transaction, perfection of an Arti-
cle 9 security interest may be accomplished automatically, by filing a
financing statement with the Secretary of State, by filing locally, by
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dation of the instrument gives notice to third parties of the
lender's interest in rents.'6
Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code permits the trustee in
bankruptcy to avoid those transfers (including liens and securi-
ty interests) that could be avoided by a bona fide purchaser of
real property or a lien creditor.1" A bona fide purchaser of
real property on which a lender had a properly recorded mort-
gage and assignment of rents would take the property subject
to that mortgage and assignment."M The purchaser, like the
borrower, could collect the rents accruing before the lender's
activation of its assignment of. rents, but once the lender had
activated its assignment of rents, the lender would be entitled
to collect rents.'" Similarly, a judgment creditor of the bor-
rower with a writ of garnishment on rents would have a right
to rents accrued or collected up to the point of activation by the
lender of its assignment of rents," but the lender would
have the right to rents accrued or collected after the activation
of its assignment. 7 Since neither a bona fide purchaser nor
a judgment creditor could avoid the lender's interest in rents, a
court should not hold that a trustee in bankruptcy may avoid
the assignment of rents pursuant to section 544, and the
filing in the real property records, or by the secured party's taking pos-
session of the collateral. U.C.C. §§ 9-302, 9-304, 9-305, 9-306, 9-401
(1990). Except for automatic perfection, each type of perfection gives
notice to third parties of the security interest. A lien on real property is
perfected by recordation in the real property records of the county in
which the property is located, thereby providing notice.
162. See SeSide, 152 B.R. at 885.
163. 11 U.S.C. 544(a) (1988). See supra note 149 for the text of this
section of the Bankruptcy Code.
164. See In re Park at Dash Point L.P., 121 B.R. 850, 855 (Bankr.
W.D. Wash. 1990), affd sub nom., Steinberg v. CrossLand Mortgage
Corp. (In re Park at Dash Point L.P.), 152 B.R. 300 (W.D. Wash. 1991),
affd, 985 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1993).
165. See Dash Point, 121 B.R. at 855.
166. See In re Mews Assocs., 144 B.R. 867, 869 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1992); Farmers' Union Jobbing Ass'n v. Sullivan, 21 P.2d 303, 303-04,
modifying 19 P.2d 476 (Kan. 1933); Miners Say. Bank v. Thomas, 12
A.2d 810, 813 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1940).
167. See Mews Assocs., 144 B.R. at 869; Farmers' Union Jobbing Ass'n
v. Sullivan, 19 P.2d 476, 478, modified, 21 P.2d 303 (Kan. 1933); Miners
Say. Bank, 12 A.2d at 813.
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courts which find that a properly recorded assignment of rents
is perfected are correct in their analysis with regard to perfec-
tion.
The nature of the security interest created by a collateral
assignment of rents is probably the root of the problem. Since
the interest is inchoate, the lender has no rights in those rents
collected by the borrower prior to activation. The collected
rents are severed from the real property, and the lender has no
right to these personal property "proceeds" of the rents."' If
the borrower is in bankruptcy, an argument can be made that
the lender has no interest in the rents once they are collected
and become cash, and if the lender has no interest in this cash,
then it should not be treated as cash collateral."9 Neverthe-
less, most courts have found a way to protect a mortgage
lender's interest in rents in bankruptcy either by finding that
the rents are cash collateral because the lender's assignment of
rents was perfected by recordation, or by permitting the lender
to file a notice with the bankruptcy court and thereby perfect
the lender's interest.17 Most commentators on the subject
have advocated that duly recorded assignments of rents be
treated as perfected"' and have criticized the view that rents
covered by a duly recorded but unactivated assignment of rents
are not cash collateral.
172
Apparently Congress also agreed that rents covered by a
duly recorded but unactivated assignment of rents should be
treated as cash collateral, for in 1992 both the Senate and the
House of Representatives passed bankruptcy reform bills that
168. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
169. This is similar to the argument made in In re Prichard Plaza
Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 84 B.R. 289 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988). See supra
note 148.
170. See supra notes 152-59 and accompanying text.
171. See Averch, supra note 27, at 528; John Collen & Douglas Rosner,
Protecting Assignments of Rents in Bankruptcy: The Case for Following In
re KNM Roswell, 20 CAL. BANKR. J. 197, 206 (1992); Sally A. Conti,
Assignments of Rent in Bankruptcy: There is Hope For Secured Creditors,
NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISOR, May 1991, at 7, 11; McCafferty, supra note
27, at 477; Schmitt, supra note 27, at 55.
172. See Collen & Rosner, supra note 171, at 37;' McCafferty, supra
note 27, at 469-70; Randolph, supra note 27, at 308-13; Schmitt, supra
note 27, at 37.
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dealt with this problem.173 A compromise bill died in the
House at the end of the congressional session as a result of
opposition from banks to a provision unrelated to the assign-
ment of rents provision.174 A new bankruptcy reform bill ad-
dressing the assignment of rents issue has been introduced in
the Senate,"5 and it is likely that some form of the bill will
173. In November of 1991, Senators Howell Heflin (Democrat, Alabama)
and Charles Grassley (Republican, Iowa) introduced a comprehensive
bankruptcy reform bill, S. 1985, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), and a ver-
sion of the bill passed the Senate by a vote of 97-0 in June of 1992, '138
CONG. REC. S8359 (daily ed. June 17, 1992). The bill provided for amend-
ment of Bankruptcy Code § 363(a) to add: "If the cash collateral includes
an interest in rents or leases, in real property, held by a creditor and
duly recorded in the public records, such interest shall be deemed per-
fected for purposes of this title .... " S. 1985, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. §
203 (1991).
The House passed a narrower bankruptcy reform bill, H.R. 6020,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), on October 3, 1992, 138 CONG. REC.
H11,059 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1992). House and Senate negotiators agreed to
a compromise measure that was passed by the Senate on October 7 by
unanimous consent agreement. 138 CONG. REC. S17,362-64 (daily ed. Oct.
7, 1992). The compromise bill provided for amendment of Bankruptcy
Code § 552(b) to treat a security interest in rents as perfected for pur-
poses of § 544(a). S. 1985, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 303 (1991) (as amend-
ed on Oct. 7, 1992).
174. See Kenneth H. Bacon, Bankruptcy Bill Dies as Some Big Banks
Oppose Provision on Priority of Creditors, WALL STREET J., Oct. 9, 1992,
at B12. The controversial provision causing the demise of the bill would
have given greater protection to retirement benefits under collective bar-
gaining agreements. Id.
175. S. 540, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 205 (1993). The most recent ver-
sion of the bill after revision in committee would amend Bankruptcy
Code § 552(b) to add:
(2XA) Except as provided in sections 363, 506(c), 522, 544, 545,
547, and 548, if -
(i) the debtor and an entity entered into a security
agreement that was duly recorded in the public records
before the commencement of the case; and
(ii) the security interest created by the security agree-
ment extends to -
(I) property of the debtor acquired before the
commencement of the case; and
(II)(aa) to amounts paid as rents of such proper-
ty; ...
the security interest extends to such amounts paid to the estate
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eventually pass.""6 If Congress passes a bankruptcy reform
bill, the bill will probably contain a provision that treats a duly
recorded assignment of rents as being perfected for bankruptcy
purposes, since the proposal is supported by a number of
groups177 and seems to have no organized opposition.7 '
Finally, state legislatures in a number of states have recent-
ly passed statutes designed to clarify the rights of a lender
under an assignment of rents. 7 ' Most of these statutes have
as rents . . . after the commencement of the case to the extent
provided in the security agreement, whether or not the security
interest in such rents . . . is perfected under applicable
nonbankruptcy law, except to the extent that the court, after
notice and a hearing and based on the equities of the case, or-
ders otherwise.
(B) If a security interest extends under subparagraph (A) to
rents acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case,
the security interest in such rents shall be deemed to be perfect-
ed for the purpose of section 544(a).
IdL
176. The Senate Judiciary Committee ordered the bill favorably report-
ed "with an amendment in the nature of a substitute" on September 15,
1993. 139 CONG. REC. D989 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1993).
177. See 1992 House Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 12, at 9-11 (state-
ment of Ronald DeKoven on behalf of the American Bankers Association),
135-36 (statement of Lawrence P. King on behalf of the National Bank-
ruptcy Conference), 190-92 (statement of Philip J. Hendel on behalf of
the Commercial Law League of America); 1991 Senate Subcomm. Hear-
ing, supra note 12, at 89-90 (statement of Mary Jane Flaherty on behalf
of the American Council of Life Insurance), 186'(statement of James W.
Nelson on behalf of the Mortgage Bankers Association of America), 214
(statement of William L. Norton III on behalf of the American Bankers
Association). Of particular significance is the support of the National
Bankruptcy Conference, which is perceived as a neutral or possibly pro-
debtor group. The National Bankruptcy Conference had originally opposed
the provision as premature but changed its position because of the
amount of litigation in the bankruptcy courts on the issue of perfection
of an assignment of rents. See 1992 House Subcomm. Hearing, supra
note 12, at 135-36 (statement of Lawrence P. King on behalf of the Na-
tional Bankruptcy Conference).
178. Although the author proposes changes in state law to correct ex-
isting problems in treatment of the assignment of rents under state and
bankruptcy law, the author advocates amendment of the Bankruptcy
Code as an interim measure to resolve the cash collateral issue.
179. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2938-2938.1 (West 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
697.07 (West Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2343 (Supp. 1992); MD.
396
RENTS AS SECURITY
provisions to the effect that a duly recorded assignment of
rents is perfected;180 therefore, the statutes seem to be aimed
at resolving the cash collateral issue in bankruptcy. Although
the statutes do apparently resolve the cash collateral issue in
the states where they have been enacted, they may produce
other problems.8 '
C. The Activated or Absolute Assignment of Rents in
Bankruptcy
Where a collateral assignment of rents is found to have been
activated by the lender prior to the borrower's bankruptcy
filing, some courts have treated rents collected after the bank-
ruptcy filing as cash collateral-property in which both the
estate and the lender have an interest. 82 These courts have
found that the lender has only a security interest in the rents
CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 3-204 (Supp. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-
20(b).(d) (Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 93.806 (Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 66-26-116 (Supp. 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-220.1 (Michie Supp.
1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.28.230(3) (West 1992).
180. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 2938(b), 2938.1(a) (West 1993); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 58-2343 (Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 3-204 (Supp.
1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-20(b)-(d) (Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. §
93.806(2) (Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-26-116 (Supp. 1992); VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-220.1 (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
7.28.230(3) (West 1992). The Florida statute does not refer to perfection
of an assignment of rents but instead provides that an assignment of
rents "shall be absolute upon the mortgagor's default." FLA. STAT. ANN. §
697.07 (West Supp. 1993).
181. For example, the Florida statute's provision making an assignment
of rents absolute upon default has led to conflicting decisions in bank-
ruptcy cases as to whether the assignment gives a lender an ownership
interest or a security interest in rents. See infra note 196. In addition,
several of the statutes do not indicate whether activation remains nec-
essary to make the lender's security interest choate; therefore, the rights
of the borrower to rents collected after default but before activation by
the lender are not clear under these statutes. See Randolph, supra note
27, at 328-29.
182. See, e.g., Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Atrium Dev. Co. (In re
Atrium Dev. Co.), 159 B.R. 464 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993); In re Willows of
Coventry, Ltd. Partnership, 154 B.R. 959 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1993); In re
Mews Assocs., 144 B.R. 867 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992); Bryn Athyn Inves-
tors, Ltd. v. Hutton/Conam Realty Pension Investors (In re Bryn Athyn
Investors, Ltd.), 69 B.R. 452 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1987).
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even after activation and that the bankruptcy estate has an
ownership interest." The holdings of these courts are based
on the respective property interests of the parties under state
law as mandated by the Supreme Court in Butner.'" In Wil-
lows, for example, the court found that the assignment of rents
was merely a security device under Indiana law and that the
lender's exercise of its rights thereunder did not change the
character of the assignment." In holding that the assign-
ment of rents created only a security interest even after activa-
tion, the court relied on the intent of the parties and the fact
that the assignment, by its terms, would become void upon full
payment of the mortgage debt.'" Where a lender is collect-
ing rents pursuant to an activated assignment of rents, the
debtor in possession is entitled to a "turnover order" requiring
the lender to return any previously collected but unapplied
rents and permitting the debtor in possession to collect future
rents."8 7
Other courts have held that a lender is the owner of rents
covered by an assignment of rents that was activated prior to
the filing of the bankruptcy petition.M The Northwest Com-
mons case was decided on the basis that a lender "foreclosed"
its interest in rents under Missouri law by activating its as-
signment of rents and therefore owned the rents.'89 The court
held that the rents were not property of the estate and there-
fore could not be cash collateral."9 Similarly, other courts
183. See Principal Mut., 159 B.R. at 470; Willows, 154 B.R. at 965;
Mews Assocs., 144 B.R. at 870; Bryn Athyn Investors, 69 B.R. at 457.
184. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
185. 154 B.R. at 965.
186. I& at 964.
187. See 11 U.S.C. § 542, 543 (1988); Willows, 154 B.R. at 967; Mews
Assocs., 144 B.R. at 871; Bryn Athyn Investors, 69 B.R. at 457-58.
188. See Commerce Bank v. Mountain View Village, Inc., 5 F.3d 34 (3d
Cir. 1993); In re Century Inv. Fund VIII Ltd. Partnership, 937 F.2d 371,
375 (7th Cir. 1991); VIII S. Michigan Assocs. v. Northern Trust Co. (In
re VIII S. Michigan Assocs.), 145 B.R. 912 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1992); In re
Mount Pleasant Ltd. Partnership, 144 B.R. 727 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1992); Imperial Gardens Liquidating Trust v. Northwest Commons, Inc.
(In re Northwest Commons, Inc.), 136 B.R. 215 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991).




have found that rents covered by an activated assignment of
rents are not property of the bankruptcy estate.'91
A similar issue may arise where an assignment of rents is
found to be an absolute assignment because an absolute as-
signment does not require activation." Most courts address-
ing the issue in the bankruptcy context have treated an abso-
lute assignment as giving a lender only a security interest in
rents.' These courts recognize the continuing interest of the
bankruptcy estate in rents covered by an absolute assignment
and have held that the rents are cash collateral. 19 This is a
clear advantage to the lender of having an absolute rather
than a collateral assignment of rents because the lender does
not have to litigate the issue of whether activation has oc-
curred or be concerned about which of the three approaches
the court will follow in treatment of an unactivated assignment
of rents.'95
A few courts have treated an absolute assignment of rents
as giving the lender an absolute ownership interest in
rents.' These courts have held that because the lender owns
191. See Commerce Bank, 5 F.3d at 39; Century Inv. Fund, 937 F.2d at
375; VIII S. Michigan Assocs., 145 B.R. at 915; Mount Pleasant, 144 B.R.
at 737.
192. See supra note 102.
193. See, e.g., In re Willows of Coventry, Ltd. Partnership, 154 B.R.
959, 964 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1993); 500 Ygnacio Assocs. v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co. (In re 500 Ygnacio Assocs.), 141 B.R. 191, 193 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
1992); In re Rollingwood Apartments, Ltd., 133 B.R. 906, 909-10 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1991); In re Bethesda Air Rights Ltd. Partnership, 117 B.R.
202, 206 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990). See also FDIC v. International Property
Management, Inc., 929 F.2d 1033, 1035 (5th Cir. 1991); In re Princeton
Overlook Joint Venture, 143 B.R. 625, 633 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1992); Provi-
dent Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Winslow Ctr. Assocs. (In re Winslow Ctr.
Assocs.), 50 B.R. 679, 681 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985).
194. See Rollingwood, 133 B.R. at 913; Princeton Overlook, 143 B.R. at
633; Bethesda, 117 B.R. at 211.
195. For a discussion of the other advantages to the lender of the abso-
lute assignment, see supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., In re Carter, 126 B.R. 811 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991); In
re Galvin, 120 B.R. 767 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1990); In re Fry Road Assocs., 64
B.R. 808 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986); In re P.M.G. Properties, 55 B.R. 864
(E.D. Mich. 1985).
The Florida legislature recently enacted a statute providing that an
assignment of rents "shall be absolute upon the mortgagor's default." FLA.
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the rents absolutely as a matter of state law, the bankruptcy
estate has no interest in the rents, and the rents are not cash
collateral." 9
Bankruptcy courts holding that either an activated collateral
assignment of rents or an absolute assignment of rents gives a
lender ownership of rents rather than just a security interest
are probably incorrect as a matter of state law. The better
reasoned opinions, in holding that the lender has only a securi-
ty interest in rents under an activated or absolute assignment,
discuss factors such as who would be entitled to the rental
stream in the event the loan were paid in full.19 If the borrow-
er has any interest remaining in the rental stream under state
law, then bankruptcy law dictates that the rental stream be
treated as part of the bankruptcy estate.1 The fact that the
STAT. ANN. § 697.07 (West Supp. 1993). Several bankruptcy courts inter-
preted the statute as effecting an absolute transfer of ownership of the
rents. See, e.g., Carter, 126 B.R. at 813; In re Thymewood Apartments,
Ltd., 123 B.R. 969 (S.D. Ohio 1991); In re 163rd St. Mini Storage, Inc.,
113 B.R. 87 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990). Other bankruptcy courts have held
that the statute does not give ownership rights but merely changes the
procedure for a lender to enforce its security interest. See, e.g., In re
Gorrow Dev. Corp., 135 B.R. 427 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991); In re
Rollingwood Apartments, Ltd., 133 B:R. 906 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991).
Florida courts have apparently now resolved the issue by holding that
the statute does not effect an absolute transfer of rents. See Nassau
Square Assocs. v. Insurance Comm'r, 579 So. 2d 259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1991).
197. See Carter, 126 B.R. at 813; Galvin, 120 B.R. at 772; Fry Road
Assocs., 64 B.R. at 809; P.M.G. Properties, 55 B.R. at 870. See also In re
Salem Plaza Assocs., 135 B.R. 753 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (The court did
not find an absolute assignment but said that rent covered by an abso-
lute assignment would not be property of the estate and therefore would
not be cash collateral.). This result might at first be appealing to a lend-
er, but there are risks to a lender who is treated as owning rents. See
supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., In re Willows of Coventry, Ltd. Partnership, 154 B.R.
959, 964 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1993); 500 Ygnacio Assocs. v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co. (In re 500 Ygnacio Assocs.), 141 B.R. 191, 195 (Bankr. N.D. Cal.
1992); In re Bethesda Air Rights Ltd. Partnership, 117 B.R. 202, 206-08
(Bankr. D. Md. 1990); Bryn Athyn Investors, Ltd. v. Hutton/Conam Real-
ty Pension Investors (In re Bryn Athyn Investors, Ltd.), 69 B.R. 452, 457
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1987). See also Equitable Mortgage Co. v. Fishman (In
re Charles D. Stapp of Nev., Inc.), 641 F.2d 737, 740 (9th Cir. 1981).
199. See .11 U.S.C. § 541 (1988); United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc.,
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lender may have taken possession of the rental stream prior to
the bankruptcy petition is irrelevant if the borrower still has
an interest in it.' As with the bankruptcy problems associat-
ed with the unactivated collateral assignment of rents, this
issue in bankruptcy is probably the result of the convoluted
nature of the state law treatment of rents as security for the
mortgage loan. Courts are not accustomed to dealing with
inchoate security interests which are made choate by activa-
tion or with absolute assignments which purport to give title to
a lender when they are in fact intended as security.
Where a court finds that rents covered by an activated or
absolute assignment are owned by the lender, the debtor in
possession does not have the rents available for operation and
maintenance of the mortgaged property as he would if rents
were treated as cash collateral. If rents are unavailable for
operation and maintenance of the property, there is almost no
hope of reorganization for a debtor in Chapter 11."°1 If the
debtor has no equity in the property and there is not "a rea-
sonable possibility of a successful reorganization within a rea-
sonable time,' ° the lender is entitled to relief from the auto-
matic stay.' Therefore, the debtor's efforts to reorganize un-
der the protection of Chapter 11 will be frustrated even in
those cases where a reorganization might otherwise have been
successful.'
462 U.S. 198, 208-09 (1983).
200. See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 208-09. But see In re Mount Pleas-
ant Ltd. Partnership, 144 B.R. 727, 737-38 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992).
201. See Averch, supra note 27, at 519 (citing In re Tripplet, 84 B.R.
84 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988); In re Fry Road Assocs., 66 B.R. 602, 604-05
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986)). In a single asset bankruptcy the borrower will
have no income available to continue operation and maintenance of the
mortgaged property.
202. United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S.
365, 376 (1988).
203. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2).
204. In at least two cases where a court has treated a lender as the
owner of rents under an activated or absolute assignment of rents, In re
Mount Pleasant Ltd. Partnership, 144 B.R. 727 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1992); In re Fry Road Assocs., 64 B.R. 808 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986),
there is a later reported decision in which the lender is granted relief
from the stay and permitted to foreclose, Grand Traverse Dev. Co. v.
Board of Trustees (In re Grand Traverse Dev. Co.), 150 B.R. 176 (Bankr.
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V. A PROPOSAL
As a means to solve the problems with respect to treatment
of rents as security for the mortgage loan both in and outside
of bankruptcy, Article 9 of the UCC should be amended to
cover rents, treating them in substantially the same manner as
accounts. In the remainder of this Article the author will dis-
cuss the rationale behind this proposal, the details of the pro-
posal, and its advantages.
A. Rationale for the Proposal
1. Similarity Between Rents and Accounts
"Accounts" are covered by Article 9 and provide a useful
analogy to rents."' An account is defined under section 9-106
of Article 9 as "any right to payment for goods sold or leased or
for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument
or chattel paper, whether or not it has been earned by perfor-
mance."' The right to rent under a real property lease is not
an account under this definition, and in fact Article 9 expressly
provides that it is not applicable to leases of, or rents from,
real estate. 7 However, because the Article 9 definition of
W.D. Mich. 1993); In re Fry Road Assocs., 66 B.R. 602 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1986). In Fry Road, one of the reasons given by the court for lifting the
stay was the lender's ownership of rents and the borrower's resulting
inability to operate and maintain the mortgaged property.
205. See Conti, supra note 171, at 9; see also In re Park at Dash Point
L.P., 121 B.R. 850, 859-60 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1990) (comparing treat-
ment of an assignment of rents with treatment of a security interest in
accounts in bankruptcy), affd sub nom. Steinberg v. CrossLand Mortgage
Corp. (In re Park at Dash Point L.P.), 152 B.R. 300 (W.D. Wash. 1991),
affd, 985 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1993).
206. U.C.C. § 9-106 (1990).
207. Id. § 9-104(j). See also FDIC v. International Property Manage-
ment, Inc., 929 F.2d 1033, 1035 (5th Cir. 1991); In re Bristol Assocs.,
505 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1974); In re Carley Capital Group, 128 B.R. 652,
658 n.6 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1991); Hollinrake v. Fed. Land Bank (In re
Hollinrake), 93 B.R. 183, 188 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1988); First Fed. Say. v.
City Nat'l Bank, 87 B.R. 565, 568 (W.D. Ark. 1988); Rostocki, supra note
28, at 151; Note, supra note 28, at 456-57. "General intangibles" is the
catchall category of intangible personal property not otherwise catego-
rized, and if rents were not specifically excluded from Article 9, they
would be general intangibles. See U.C.C. § 9-106.
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accounts does include accounts that are to be paid periodically
over some fixed period of time,0 s an account can constitute a
valuable income stream similar to the right to rent under a
lease. In addition, the definition of an account under Article 9
includes not only those rights to payment that have been fully
earned by performance, but also rights under an executory
contract for goods or services or under a personal property
lease where performance has not yet been earned. ' Those
accounts not yet fully earned by performance, which were
formerly classified under Article 9 as "contract rights,"10 are
the accounts with the most similarity to rents because a real
property lease also contains continuing obligations of the landlord 211
Although a lease was traditionally treated as a conveyance
of land,21 2 courts now recognize to a greater extent the contrac-
tual nature of a lease.21 It is the contractual nature of a
208. An example would be an account resulting from a lease of person-
al property.
209. U.C.C. § 9-106.
210. The 1972 Amendments to Article 9 eliminated the distinction be-
tween accounts, defined as rights to payment already earned by perfor-
mance, and contract rights, defined as rights to payment not yet earned
by performance, because the distinction was unnecessary and created
some problems. U.C.C. § 9-106, Official Reasons for 1972 Change, 3
U.L.A. 236 (1992).
211. A similar analogy could be made between real property leases and
chattel paper. Chattel paper is defined in Article 9 as "a writing or writ-
ings which evidence both a monetary obligation and a security interest in
or a lease of specific goods." U.C.C. § 9-105(b). A lender can take an
Article 9 security interest in a lease of personal property in addition to
the stream of rent created by the lease. Similarly, a mortgage lender can
take an assignment of leases of, as well as rents from, mortgaged proper-
ty.
212. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *316; 2 RICHARD R.
POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 221[1][a] (1993). The lease for a term of
years first developed at a time when agricultural use of land was pre-
dominant and most leases conveyed unimproved property for agricultural
purposes. John F. Hicks, The Contractual Nature of Real Property Leases,
24 BAYLOR L. REV. 443, 450 (1972). At that time there were rarely struc-
tural improvements on the land and, where there were improvements,
they were relatively unimportant as compared to the land. Id. The
landlord's obligation under the lease was merely to deliver possession,
and the tenant, unless ousted from possession, was required to pay rent.
Id
213. See 2 POWELL, supra note 212, 9 221[1I[a]; Hicks, supra note 212,
19931 403
RUTGERS LAW REVIEW
lease that makes the right to the payment of rent under a
lease so similar to the right to receive payment pursuant to an
account. A modem lease is likely to cover improved proper-
ty214 and to have a profusion of covenants between landlord
and tenant.21 A landlord may have obligations to provide utili-
ties, maintenance, security, and numerous other services, and
the tenant's payment of rent is in exchange for these services
as well as for possession of the real property.216 Despite the
profusion of covenants in the modem lease, contract principles
are not always applied to leases because of the continued per-
ception of the lease as both conveyance and contract.21 Never-
theless, Article 9 covers certain types of accounts that are quite
similar in nature to the right of a landlord to receive rent un-
der a lease.
2. Treatment of Accounts Under Article 9
Article 9 provides a comprehensive scheme for the treatment
of security interests in accounts,21 which can be compared to
the law governing assignments of rents. A security interest in
accounts attaches under Article 9 when the debtor has signed
at 452-53.
214. Hicks, supra note 212, at 451. In some instances the lease covers
nothing but improvements, as would be the case with the lease of space
on an upper floor of a multi-story building.
215. I1& at 451-52.
216. Nevertheless, the law has traditionally treated rent as being paid
solely for the right of possession because the lease Was primarily a con-
veyance with covenants being merely incidental. Id. at 461. Only a
breach by the landlord which is so serious as to constitute an actual or
constructive eviction of the tenant or which otherwise goes to the total
consideration for the lease excuses the tenant from the obligation to pay
rent. Id at 542. Other covenants breached by the landlord are generally
considered independent of the tenant's obligation to pay rent. Id.
217. For example, the doctrine of independent lease covenants still
applies to a great extent. See supra note 216. In addition, the require-
ment that a landlord mitigate damages by trying to relet upon the
tenant's abandonment of the premises has been adopted by less than a
majority of the states. See Hicks, supra note 212, at 543.
218. The following sections of Article 9 are specifically applicable to
security interests in or sales of accounts: §§ 9-102(lXb), 9-103(1), 9-104(f),
9-106, 9-205, 9-206(1), 9-301(lXd), 9-302(1)(e), 9-306(5), 9.318, 9-401, 9-
502, and 9-504(2). U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 5 (1990).
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a security agreement, value has been given, and the debtor has
rights in the accounts."1 9 The security interest is perfected by
filing a financing statement in the office of the Secretary of
State,' and perfection and the effect thereof are governed by
the law of the state in which the debtor is located. 1 Part 3
of Article 9 provides the rules for priority of a security interest
in accounts as against other interests in the accounts. '
With regard to enforcement, Article 9 provides that a se-
cured party with a security interest in accounts is entitled
"[w]hen so agreed and in any event on default... to notify an
account debtor.., to make payment to him whether or not the
assignor was theretofore making collections on the collateral,
and also to take control of any proceeds to which he is enti-
tled."' Therefore, the only action that a secured party need
take in order to begin collecting accounts covered by the securi-
ty interest is to give notice to the account debtors. The secured
party's security interest in amounts previously collected by the
debtor is recognized in that the secured party is entitled to
take control of identifiable proceeds of the accounts. This can
be contrasted with the collateral assignment of rents which
requires activation by onerous action in many states and which
only extends to those rents collected after the assignment of
rents has been activated.' Article 9 provides protection for a
secured party against a debtor's collection of accounts and
application of the proceeds to pay debts unrelated to the busi-
ness being financed by the secured party. This scenario is
comparable to the milking of real property, and the Article 9
approach is preferable to the cumbersome requirements that a
mortgage lender must meet prior to collecting rents pursuant
to a collateral assignment of rents.
219. Id. § 9-203(1).
220. Id. §§ 9-302, 9-401(1).
221. Id. § 9-103(3)(b).
222. Id. §§ 9-301 - 9-318.
223. Id. § 9-502(1). Article 9 provides other remedies to a secured party
with a security interest in accounts. The secured party may sell the
accounts in a commercially reasonable manner, id § 9-504, or may give
notice to the debtor that the secured party intends to keep the accounts
in full satisfaction of the indebtedness, id § 9-505.
224. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
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Article 9 applies not only to security interests in ac-
counts2 but also, with some exceptions, to sales of ac-
counts.'6 Article 9 does, however, distinguish between a
security interest in accounts and a true sale of accounts where
that distinction is necessary. Section 9-502 gives the secured
party the right to notify account debtors to make payments
directly to the secured party but requires the secured party to
act in a commercially reasonable manner in collecting the
accounts.' Furthermore, the secured party must account to
the debtor for any surplus in funds collected over the amount
of the debt, and the debtor is liable for any deficiency where
the collection of the accounts by the secured party is based on
a security interest.' If the underlying transaction is a sale
of accounts, however, the secured party has no duty of com-
mercial reasonableness, and the debtor is entitled to surplus or
is liable for deficiency only if the agreement between the par-
ties so provides.2
225. U.C.C. § 9-102(lXa).
226. I& § 9-102(I)(b). The reason for including sales of accounts within
the scope of Article 9 is that "[clommercial financing on the basis of
accounts and chattel paper is often so conducted that the distinction be-
tween a security transfer and a sale is blurred." Id. § 9-102 cmt. 2. Arti-
cle 9 does not apply to sales of accounts as a part of a sale of an entire
business, assignments of accounts for the purpose of collection only,
transfers of accounts made with an assumption by the assignee of obliga-
tions under the related contract, or sales of a single account in whole or
partial satisfaction of a preexisting indebtedness. Id. § 9-104(f).
227. I& § 9-502(2). This section provides:
A secured party who by agreement is entitled to charge
back uncollected collateral or otherwise to full or limited recourse
against the debtor and who undertakes to collect from the ac-
count debtors or obligors must proceed in a commercially reason-
able manner and may deduct his reasonable expenses of real-
ization from the collections. If the security agreement secures an
indebtedness, the secured party must account to the debtor for
any surplus, and unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for
any deficiency. But, if the underlying transaction was a sale of
accounts or chattel paper, the debtor is entitled to any surplus




229. Id. Of course, the fact that the debtor is entitled to surplus or
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In the context of the Article 9 security interest in accounts,
no device similar to the absolute assignment is necessary be-
cause the enforcement of the security interest requires only
that notice be given to account debtors and because the securi-
ty interest covers proceeds of the accounts.' A security inter-
est in accounts is treated as a security interest, and a sale of
accounts is treated as a sale. 1 Several courts have discussed
factors to be considered in determining whether a transfer of
accounts creates a security interest or constitutes a sale of the
accounts, 2 and the issue of whether a transfer of accounts is
liable for a deficiency will be evidence tending to show that a security
interest rather than a sale was intended. See In re Evergreen Valley
Resort, 23 B.R. 659, 661 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982).
230. U.C.C. § 9-502(1).
231. Article 9 promotes a policy of substance over form. See Id. § 9-
102; Evergreen Valley Resort, 23 B.R. at 661; Georgia-Pacific Corp. v.
Lumber Products Co., 590 P.2d 661, 664 (Okla. 1979).
232. See Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d
538 (3d Cir. 1979); Levin v. City Trust Co. (In re Joseph Kanner Hat
Co.), 482 F.2d 937, 940-41 (2d Cir. 1973); Evergreen Valley Resort, 23
B.R. at 661; Gold Coast Leasing Co. v. California Carrots, Inc., 155 Cal.
Rptr. 511, 514-15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Georgia-Pacific, 590 P.2d at 664-
65. The Evergreen court discussed the factors involved in the determina-
tion as follows:
Several factors have emerged through court interpretation of
[U.C.C. § 9-102] which indicate when an assignment operates to
create a security interest only. A security interest is indicated
where the assignee retains a right to a deficiency on the debt if
the assignment does not provide sufficient funds to satisfy the
amount of debt. A security interest is also indicated when the
assignee acknowledges that his rights in the assigned property
would be extinguished if the debt owed were to be paid through
some other source. Likewise, a security interest is indicated if
the assignee must account to the assignor for any surplus re-
ceived from the assignment over the amount of the debt. Evi-
dence that the assignor's debt is not reduced on account of the
assignment is also evidence that the assignment is intended as
security. Finally, the contract language itself may express the
intent that the assignment is for security only. In contrast, as-
signments have been found to be absolute transfers where the
assignment operates to discharge the underlying debt.
Evergreen Valley Resort, 23 B.R. at 661-62 (citations omitted). In deter-
mining whether a transaction is a financing arrangement or a sale, the
question for a court "is whether the nature of the recourse, and the true
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for security or is a sale seems not to have posed the problems
it has in the context of the assignment of rents.
Where the treatment of the assignment of rents is inconsis-
tent among the various states,' Article 9 provides a model
of consistency since some version of Article 9 has now been
adopted in all fifty states.' In fact, one purpose of the UCC
was to make the law uniform among the various jurisdic-
tions.' Another purpose of the UCC was "to simplify, clarify
and modernize the law governing commercial transac-
tions."' Because the UCC was drafted with the modern com-
mercial transaction in mind, the policies it promotes are likely
to be rational in modern times, unlike the law relating to as-
signments of rents.
3. Bankruptcy Treatment of a Security Interest in Accounts
The bankruptcy treatment of Article 9 security interests in
accounts, unlike the bankruptcy treatment of assignments of
rents, has been rather straightforward. Amounts collected by a
debtor in bankruptcy on accounts covered by a perfected Arti-
cle 9 security interest have been treated as cash collateral."7
nature of the transaction, are such that the legal rights and economic
consequences of the agreement bear a greater similarity to a financing
transaction or to a sale." Major's Furniture Mart, 602 F.2d at 544 (foot-
note omitted).
233. See supra notes 7.9 and 50.60 and accompanying text.
234. Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Code Has Been Adopted, 3 U.L.A.
1 (1992).
235. U.C.C. § 1-102(2Xc).
236. Id at § 1-102(2Xa).
237. See Dewhirst v. Citibank (In re Contractors Equipment Supply
Co.), 861 F.2d 241, 245 (9th Cir. 1988); see also In re Park at Dash
Point L.P., 121 B.R. 850, 859-60 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1990) (comparing
treatment of an assignment of rents with treatment of a security interest
in accounts in bankruptcy), affd sub nom. Steinberg v. CrossLand Mort-
gage Corp. (In re Park at Dash Point L.P.), 152 B.R. 300 (W.D. Wash.
1991), affd, 985 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1993). Perfection of an Article 9
security interest in accounts has caused no confusion. It is accomplished
by filing a financing statement in the office of the Secretary of State.
U.C.C. §§ 9-302, 9-401(1). The perfected security interest extends to
amounts collected by the debtor which are proceeds of the accounts, pro-
vided that the proper steps are taken for perfection of the security inter-
est in the cash proceeds and to the extent that a perfected security in-
[Vol.46:349408
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Where a secured party has notified account debtors to make
payments to the secured party prior to the filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition, the issue arises as to whether accounts collect-
ed, or to be collected, by the secured party are property of the
estate. One court held that amounts collected by the secured
party became property of the secured party (and not of the
estate) only when the secured party had made an accounting to
the debtor as required by section 9-562(2).' Amounts accru-
ing after the bankruptcy filing and not yet collected by a se-
cured party are clearly property of the estate and are to be
treated as cash collateral. 9 It is only where accounts have
actually been sold to a secured party that the bankruptcy- es-
tate would have no interest in the accounts accruing after the
bankruptcy filing.
40
4. Similarity Between Rents and Crops
Like accounts, crops are covered by Article 9 and are in
some ways analogous to rents. Just as unsevered rents are
treated as real property, growing crops have traditionally been
considered a part of the real property on which they are grow-
ing unless they had been severed. 41 Actual severance occurs
terest in cash proceeds is available. Id. §§ 9-502, 9-306. Since a perfected
Article 9 security interest in accounts cannot be avoided by a trustee in
bankruptcy under section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, both the debtor
and the secured party have an interest in these funds making them cash
collateral. 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (1988).
238. In re Fajardo, 89 B.R. 232, 233 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988).
239. Dewhirst v. Citibank (In re Contractors Equipment Supply Co.),
861 F.2d 241, 245 (9th Cir. 1988).
240. See In re Evergreen Valley Resort, Inc., 23 B.R. 659, 661 (Bankr.
D. Me. 1982) ("The estate would have an interest in these funds only if
the assignment . . . was intended to be a security transaction as opposed
to an absolute transfer.").
241. See In re Bunting, 60 F.2d 605, 607 (E.D. Ill. 1932); Silveira v.
Ohm, 201 P.2d 387, 389 (Cal. 1949); Womach v. Thomas, 486 A-2d 15,
17 (Del. Ch. 1984); Bornstein v. Somerson, 341 So. 2d 1043, 1046 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Kroh v. Dobson, 37 N.W.2d 144, 145 (Mich. 1949);
Farmers' Bank v. Bradley, 288 S.W. 774, 775 (Mo. 1926). In some states
unharvested crops which are fully matured are treated as personal prop-
erty. See Tolland Co. v. First State Bank, 35 P.2d 867, 869 (Colo. 1934);
Goldstein v. Mundon, 210 N.W. 444 (Iowa 1926); Kettering v. Barber, 159
N.W. 133, 134 (S.D. 1916); Willis v. Moore, 59 Tex. 628, 637 (1883).
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when crops are harvested," and constructive severance oc-
curs when an interest in the crops is reserved in a sale of the
lande'3 or when growing crops are sold or mortgaged separate
from the land.2" As with rents, a sale of real property will
convey unsevered crops growing on the land unless there has
been an express reservation by the seller of the right to the
crops." Many pre-Code cases and even some modem ones
discuss crops and rents together and treat them in the same
manner with regard to the rights of a mortgage lender2 6
Growing crops are subject to execution as personal property. See Tolland,
35 P.2d at 869; Womach, 486 A.2d at 17; Kroh, 37 N.W.2d at 145; Hay-
ward v. Poindexter, 229 S.W. 256, 258 (Mo. Ct. App. 1921); Langford v.
Hudson, 241 S.W. 393, 394 (Tenn. 1922).
242. See Womach, 486 A.2d at 18; Kroh, 37 N.W.2d at 145; Hayward,
229 S.W. at 258; Gulf Stream Realty Co. v. Monte Alto Citrus Ass'n, 253
S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
243. See Kroh, 37 N.W.2d at 145; Hayward, 229 S.W. at 258; Langford,
241 S.W. at 394.
244. See Tolland, 35 P.2d at 868-69; Bornstein, 341 So. 2d at 1046;
Kroh, 37 N.W.2d at 145; Farmers' Bank, 288 S.W. at 775; Gulf Stream,
253 S.W.2d at 936.
245. See Silveira, 201 P.2d at 389; Womach, 486 A.2d at 17; Kroh, 37
N.W.2d at 145; Hayward, 229 S.W. at 258; Langford, 241 S.W. at 394;
Willis, 59 Tex. at 638. This is true whether the conveyance is voluntary
or involuntary, as in the case of a foreclosure sale. Womach, 486 A.2d at
17.
246. See, e.g., Federal Land Bank v. Terpstra (In re Porter), 90 B.R.
399, 403 (N.D. Iowa 1988) (discussing pre-Code Iowa law); Hill v. Earth-
man (In re Hill), 83 B.R. 522, 528 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988) (Pre-Code
Tennessee law "treated rent and crops essentially the same in determin-
ing the rights of a creditor with a mortgage on the land."); Lake County
Tr. Co. v. Two Bar B, Inc., 606 N.E.2d 258, 263 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
("[T]he mortgagor is entitled to the rents, profits and crops of the mort-
gaged property as long as he lawfully remains in possession of the pre-
mises."); Farmers' Bank, 288 S.W. at 775 ("[Mortgagor] has the right to
sever growing crops from the ground, or collect rents and profits...
until possession taken or foreclosure under the deed of trust."; Treetop
Apartments Gen. Partnership v. Oyster, 800 S.W.2d 628, 629 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1990) ("A purchaser at foreclosure does not acquire title to rents or
crops that the landowner has severed from the land prior to the foreclo-
sure."); Security Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Gill; 27 S.W. 835, 836 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1894) (treating rents in the same manner as crops under pre-
Code Texas law). Both pre-Code and modem cases hold that crops are
covered by a "rents and profits' clause in a mortgage. See, e.g., Bunting,
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Growing crops, however, unlike rents, are treated under Arti-
cle 9 as personal property for purposes of the creation of a
security interest in them. 7
*It is difficult to explain why crops were included within the
scope of Article 9 while rents were excluded. Since one means
of severing rents is the granting of a security interest in them
apart from the real estate,2 8 treating rents as personal prop-
erty for purposes of the creation of a security interest in them
is not novel or extraordinary. 249 Rents may have been exclud-
ed from Article 9 because security interests in rents are usual-
ly created in conjunction with a real estate mortgage and thus
not in the type of commercial transaction which Article 9 was
intended to cover, or the exclusion may have been based more
on politics than on reason'
60 F.2d at 607; Tolland, 35 P.2d at 869; Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. First Interstate Bank, 703 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); An-
na Nat1 Bank v. Prater, 506 N.E.2d 769, 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987);
Landen v. Production Credit Ass'n, 737 P.2d 1325, 1331 (Wyo. 1987).
247. This could be explained on the basis that the creation of a securi-
ty interest in the crops severs the crops from the real property. See
Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 703 P.2d at 1318. Under this reasoning
a lien on crops could still be created and perfected pursuant to real prop-
erty law, and some courts so hold. See id.; Anna Nat'l Bank, 506 N.E.2d
at 776; Landen, 737 P.2d at 1331. See also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 69, § 24-6. However, other courts and a number of commentators
indicate that a security interest in growing crops may be created and
perfected only pursuant to Article 9. See United States v. Newcomb, 682
F.2d 758, 761 (8th Cir. 1982); Hill, 83 B.R. at 528; 2 GILMORE, supra
note 67, § 32.5; Peter F. Coogan & Albert L. Clovis, The Uniform Com-
mercial Code and Real Estate Law: Problems for Both the Real Estate
Lawyer and the Chattel Security Lawyer, 38 IND. L.J. 535, 551-52 (1963);
Peter F. Coogan & C. Parkhill Mays, Jr., Crop Financing and Article 9:
A Dialogue with Particular Emphasis on the Problems of Florida Citrus
Crop Financing, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 13, 30-31 (1967); John C. Miller,
Farm Collateral Under the UCC. "Those Are Some Mighty Tall Silos,
Ain't They Fella?", 2 AGRIC. L.J. 253, 270 (1980).
248. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
249. See BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE I1 1.08[10][b] (2d ed. 1988) ([T]he as-
signment of rentals under a real estate lease may well involve personal
property under state decisional law."); 1 GILMORE, supra note 67, § 10.6
("No doubt under pre-Code law in most states a real estate . . . lease
could be effectively pledged.").
250. 1 GILMORE, supra note 67, § 10.7. Gilmore provides:
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B. Details of the Proposal
The author's proposal is that rents from real property should
be covered by Article 9 and treated essentially the same as
accounts. Rents should be defined as a separate category of
intangible property because in a few instances a security inter-
est in rents should be treated differently from a security inter-
est in accounts or general intangibles. 1 Article 9 would pro-
Section 9-104 contains a list of "Transactions Excluded from
Article." This curiously compiled list defies rational analysis. In
part it merely reiterates, negatively, what has already been said,
affirmatively, in § 9-102 on Policy and Scope. In part it seeks to
exclude transactions which, although they might fall within the
broadly stated coverage of § 9-102, are not the sort of "commer-
cial" transactions which the Article is designed to regulate. In
part it reflects what might be described as politically inspired
concessions by the Code sponsors to interests which, for good or
bad or no reasons, did not want transactions in which they were
involved covered by a new-fangled statute.
Id.
251. See infra note 254 and accompanying text.
Unfortunately, the semantics of the words "rent" and "account" are
not consistent. While an account is a right to payment, the more common
understanding of the term "rent" refers to the payment itself rather than
the right to the payment. Tiffany discusses the various meanings of the
term "rent" as follows:
The word is used in the law in at least four distinct senses,
which it is desirable clearly to distinguish. It is in the first place
used in a general sense, to describe any and every tribute which
may be payable by one on account of an estate in the land, as
when we say that rent is usually payable in money, or rent is
collectible by distress, or rent must be certain in amount, and,
thus used, it applies either to one payment of tribute to be
made, one "installment of rent" or to a secession of such pay-
ments. . . . In the second place, the word is used specifically to
describe a particular payment of tribute, to be made by a tenant
of particular land, or a succession of such payments. For in-
stance, we may say that the rent of a tenant of certain land is
overdue, meaning thereby that one installment of the rent is
overdue or that a number of installments are overdue. And so
we speak of an action having been brought for "the rent," mean-
ing thereby an action for one installment or several install-
ments. . . . In the third place, the word is used specifically to
describe the right which a particular person or persons may have
to a succession of payments by the tenant or tenants of a partic-
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vide the general scheme for creation, perfection, operation, and
enforcement of a security interest in rents.
As with security interests in accounts, a security interest in
rents would attach when the debtor had signed a security
agreement, value had been given, and the debtor had obtained
rights in the rents. 2 Upon attachment the security interest
would be good as between the debtor and the secured par-
ty.' Unlike the security interest in accounts, perfection of a
security interest in rents would be attained by filing a financ-
ing statement in the real property records of the county in
which the rent-producing property is located because the rental
stream would be severed from the real property upon granting
ular piece of land, as when we refer to a man as having a rent
or a ground rent, or say that the rent upon (issuing from) a
certain piece of land belongs to a named individual.... In the
fourth place, the word is used to designate sums paid as rent,
the proceeds, that is, of the payment of one or more of the peri-
odic installments, as when one speaks of applying the rent in a
certain manner, meaning thereby what is received on account of
rent.
3 HERBERT T. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 876 (3d ed.
1939).
An assignment of rents is intended to create a security interest in
the right to receive payment, and an Article 9 security interest in rents
would be a security interest in the right to receive payment; therefore,
the term under Article 9 would be used in the third sense discussed by
Tiffany. In addition, the proceeds provisions of Article 9 would extend the
security interest to the collected payments which are the proceeds of the
right to receive payment. To avoid the semantics problem, a term other
than "rent" could be used, but the use of the term "rent" would make it
clear that a security interest in the right to receive the payment of rents
is within the exception to the general rule that after-acquired property of
a bankruptcy estate is not subject to a pre-petition lien. See 11 U.S.C. §
552(b) (1988). See also infra notes 271-72.
252. U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (1990). A security interest could attach only to
those rents accruing under existing leases since the debtor would not
have rights under a lease to be entered into in the future.
The 1962 version of Article 9 specifically provided that a debtor had
no rights "in crops until they [were] planted or otherwise [became] grow-
ing crops." U.C.C. § 9-204(2)(a) (1962). This provision was eliminated in
the 1972 version of Article 9 because it was "unnecessary and in some
cases confusing." U.C.C. § 9-204 Official Reasons for 1972 Change, 3
U.L.A 447 (1992).
253. U.C.C. § 9-203 cmt. 1 (1990).
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of the security interest.' Also unlike the security interest in
accounts, perfection and the effect thereof would be governed
by the law of the state in which the rent producing property is
located. Again, because the granting of the security interest
would sever the rental stream from the real property, notice of
that severance should be given in the state where the real
property is located. Once perfected, the security interest in
rents would have priority as against other interests in the
rents as provided in Part 3 of Article 9.' In some cases the
priority issues arising with regard to security interests in rents
would be analogous to the priority issues arising with regard
to security interests in crops.2w
In most cases the security interest in rents would be taken
by a mortgage lender, but it would be possible for a debtor to
grant a security interest in rents independent of any mort-
gage. 7 The creation of a security interest in rents would
254. See Valley Nat'l Bank v. Avco Dev. Co., 480 P.2d'671 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1971) (holding that a sale of rents which severs them from the real
estate must be recorded in the real property records). Two of the alterna-
tive provisions regarding place of filing of a financing statement covering
crops which are growing or to be grown provide for filing in the county
where the land is located. U.C.C. § 9-401.
255. U.C.C. §§ 9-301 to 9-318.
256. One priority issue which arises with crops is between the holder
of a duly recorded real estate mortgage purporting to cover crops specifi-
cally or as "rents and profits" and a secured party with a security agree-
ment covering crops that was perfected after the recordation of the mort-
gage. There is a split in authority as to which party prevails. Compare
United States v. Newcomb, 682 F.2d 758 (8th Cir. 1982) (secured party
prevails) with Anna Nat'l Bank v. Prater, 506 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987) (mortgagee prevails). The problem arises because it is unclear
whether it is still possible to create and perfect a lien on crops under
real estate law. See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text. A similar
priority contest could arise between the holder of a duly recorded mort-
gage covering rents and a secured party with a security interest in rents
but would not cause a problem because any security interest in rents
would be perfected by recordation in the real estate records.
Article 9 provides a special priority for a security interest in crops
securing a current crop production loan. U.C.C. § 9-312(2). This type of
priority provision would not be necessary with regard to rents because
there is no "rents" loan analogous to the crop production loan.
257. The Restatement also contemplates the creation of a security inter-
est in rents independent of any lien on the real estate. See RESTATEMENT
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sever the rents from the real property just as the creation of a
security interest in crops severs the crops from the real estate.
A mortgage lender with a security interest in rents would
continue to have all of the rights of a mortgagee in the state
where the mortgaged property was located.' In those states
where a lender now has the right to take possession of the
mortgaged property upon default, the lender could still take
possession of the mortgaged property in addition to exercising
its rights pursuant to its security interest in the rents. The
lender would have the right to foreclose on the mortgaged
property, and upon foreclosure, the lender would have a right
to take possession of the property and collect rents as the own-
er of the property. Article 9 facilitates this result because it
provides that where a security agreement covers both real
property and personal property, the secured party need only
conduct a foreclosure on the real property in order to foreclose
on the personal property. 9
The effect of the Article 9 security interest in rents would be
to give the lender the right to reach the rents upon default
independently of the lender's rights to possession of the real
estate. The lender would simply notify the tenants that they
were to begin making payments to the lender pursuant to the
security agreement,2" and rents collected would be applied
against the indebtedness. The lender would be required to
account to the borrower for any surplus, and the borrower
would remain liable to the lender for any deficiency remaining
after application of rental income to the debt." The lender
would have a duty to act in a commercially reasonable manner
in collecting the rents.'
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SECURITY (MORTGAGES) § 4.2 illus. 4, 5 (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1992).
258. See supra note 45.
259. U.C.C. § 9-501(4). Therefore, lenders would probably want to cre-
ate the security interest in rents in the mortgage instrument.
260. See U.C.C. § 9-502(1). The secured party would also have the
right to sell the rental stream in a commercially reasonable manner, id.
§ 9-504, or could give notice to the debtor that the secured party intend-
ed to keep the rental stream in full satisfaction of the indebtedness, id. §
9-505.
261. See id. § 9-502(2).
262. See id. Real estate lenders may have some concern about the
19931 415
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The Article 9 scheme would address the arguments made by
courts in support of the requirement that a lender take posses-
sion of the mortgaged property or some equivalent action in
order to activate a security interest in rents.20 First, the re-
quirement that a lender act in a commercially reasonable man-
ner in collecting rents would solve the objection by some courts
that a lender might let rents go uncollected unless the lender
was required to take possession prior to collection of rents.'"
Second, the Article 9 approach to cash proceeds would circum-
vent the need for imposition of a constructive trust on rents
collected by a borrower after default.' A lender would have
access to proceeds of rents to the extent the lender could meet
its burden to trace and identify the funds.2"
In bankruptcy, rents covered by a perfected Article 9 securi-
ty interest would be cash collateral regardless of whether the
lender had taken steps to enforce its security interest. Because
imposition of a requirement of commercial reasonableness on the collec-
tion of rents from tenants. Neither § 9-502 nor the comments relating
thereto discuss commercial reasonableness in the context of the collection
of accounts. Id. A few cases have addressed the issue. See Manufacturers
& Traders Trust Co. v. Pro-Mation, Inc., 497 N.Y.S.2d 541, 542 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1985) (holding that secured party's notification of account debt-
ors to remit payments to bank was commercially reasonable); DeLay First
Natl Bank & Trust Co. v. Jacobson Appliance Co., 243 N.W.2d 745, 751
(Neb. 1976) (holding that bank did not sustain its burden of proof to
show commercial reasonableness where record showed bank took posses-
sion of debtor's records on accounts, sent two letters on some of them,
and took no further action). A secured party should not be required to
pursue a judgment against an account debtor (or tenant) in order to
satisfy the requirement of commercial reasonableness. See CLARK, supra
note 249, 1 4.04 at 4-57; 9 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND ET AL, UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE SERIES § 9-502:03 (1991).
263. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 65 and 69 and accompanying text. A security
interest in accounts is not invalidated by reason of the right of the debt-
or to collect accounts or to use, commingle, or dispose of the proceeds
thereof. U.C.C. § 9-205. Similarly, a security interest in rents would not
be invalidated by these rights in the borrower.
266. See U.C.C. §§ 9-306, 9-502(1); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 69,
§ 23-7. Article 9 provides special rules for perfection of a security inter-
est in proceeds where the debtor is in bankruptcy. See U.C.C. § 9-306(4);
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 69, § 23-7.
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Article 9 makes clear the distinction between perfection and
enforcement, rents covered by a perfected security interest
would be treated as cash collateral even if the lender had not
yet enforced its security interest by notifying tenants to pay
rents to the lender. If the lender had notified tenants and had
begun collecting rents pre-petition, those rents already collect-
ed and applied to the debt would not be property of the bank-
ruptcy estate. Rents not yet collected by the lender at the com-
mencement of bankruptcy would be considered cash collateral,
and the trustee in bankruptcy or debtor in possession would be
entitled to a turnover order requiring tenants to once again
make payments to the trustee or debtor.' Since rents cov-
ered by an Article 9 security interest would be cash collateral,
the debtor would not be entitled to use the rents without the
consent of the lender or authorization of the court.' The
court could authorize the debtor to use rents for operation and
maintenance of the property, and in many cases the debtor and
lender would reach an agreement as to the use of the rents,
with the debtor keeping enough funds to pay expenses of the
property and the lender receiving the remainder for application
against interest accruing on the indebtedness.
Finally, the author's proposal would address several inciden-
tal issues arising with respect to security interest in rents.
Article 9 provides a method for the determination of the rights
of the account debtor when issues arise with regard to defenses
to, modification of, or payment under the contract giving rise
to the account.' It would similarly address these issues with
267. 11 U.S.C. § 542 (1988).
268. Id. § 363(cX2).
269. See U.C.C. § 9-318. In the absence of an agreement to the con-
trary, the assignee of an account is subject to claims and defenses aris-
ing from the terms of the contract and any other claim or defense aris-
ing before the account debtor receives notice of the assignment. Id. § 9-
318(1). A modification of an assigned contract "made in good faith and in
accordance with reasonable commercial standards is effective against an
assignee." Id. § 9-318(2). "An account debtor is authorized to pay the
assignor until the account debtor receives notification [of the assignment]
and that payment is to be made to the assignee." Id § 9-318(3). If the
assignee does not provide reasonable proof of the assignment to the ac-




regard to the rights of a tenant."0 In addition, courts are cur-
rently split on the issue of whether certain types of income
from real property are accounts covered by Article 9 or
rents.2" Because rents as well as accounts would be defined
270. In fact, cases of a mortgagor milking rents from mortgaged proper-
ty were considered in determining that only those modifications "made in
good faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial standards"
would be effective against an assignee. See 2 GILMORE, supra note 67, §§
41.9-41.10.
271. The classic example of this type of income is room revenues from
a hotel, but the issue arises with regard to any income which results
from the use of real property pursuant to a license or some other agree.
ment which is not a lease, such as revenue from a parking lot, a boat
marina, or a college dormitory. A number of courts have recently held
that hotel room revenues are accounts as defined in Article 9. See, e.g.,
United States v. PS Hotel Corp., 404 F.Supp. 1188 (E.D. Mo. 1975), afld
per curiam, 527 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1975); Super 8 Motels, Inc. v. M.
Vickers, Ltd. (In re M. Vickers, Ltd.), 111 B.R. 332, 332 (D. Colo. 1990);
In re Corpus Christi Hotel Partners, Ltd., 133 B.R. 850, 854 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1991); Kearney Hotel Partners v. Richardson (In re Kearney Hotel
Partners), 92 B.R. 95, 102 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988). A few courts have
held that hotel room revenues are rents. See, e.g., In re S.F. Drake Hotel
Assocs., 131 B.R. 156, 160 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991), affd, 147 B.R. 538
(N.D. Cal. 1992).
The uncertainty over classification of hotel room revenues would not
seem to be a problem for lenders since a prudent lender could simply
take a security interest in both accounts and rents in connection with a
loan secured by a hotel. However, a problem does arise when the borrow-
er is in bankruptcy because property acquired by the bankruptcy estate
after the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding is not subject to a
pre-petition lien. 11 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1988). If hotel room revenues are
classified as accounts, then revenues generated from guests arriving after
the filing of the bankruptcy petition may not be subject to a pre-petition
security agreement and therefore may not be cash collateral. See In re
Corpus Christi Hotel Partners, Ltd., 133 B.R. at 857. "Proceeds, product,
offspring, rents, or profits" of property covered by a pre-petition security
interest are subject to an exception to the lien avoidance mechanism of §
552(a). 11 U.S.C. § 552(b). Therefore, if hotel room revenues are consid-
ered rents, profits, or proceeds of mortgaged property, a security interest
in room revenues does extend to room revenues generated from hotel
guests arriving after the filing of the bankruptcy petition, and these
room revenues are cash collateral. See In re S.F. Drake Hotel Assocs.,
131 B.R. at 160; Mid-City Hotel Assocs. v. Prudential Ins. Co. (In re
Mid-City Hotel Assocs.), 114 B.R. 634, 641 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990). For a
full discussion of these issues, see Craig A. Averch, The Heartbreak Hotel
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in Article 9, there would be a means for drawing a line be-
tween the two.
2
C. Advantages of the Proposal
The best solution to the problems under current law with
regard to the treatment of rents as security for the mortgage
loan is the amendment of Article 9 to encompass rents. A secu-
rity interest in rents created under Article 9 could be enforced
by notice to tenants rather than by onerous actions on the part
of the lender such as taking possession of the property or ob-
taining the appointment of a receiver. This approach would
prevent milking of mortgaged properties by borrowers and
would provide the maximum assurance of continued operation
and maintenance of mortgaged properties."5 In addition, a
lender's security interest could extend to proceeds of rents if
the parties so intended, which would give the lender the right
to rents collected by the borrower after default to the extent
they could be traced and identified."
Amendment of Article 9 to cover rents would promote the
negotiation of an ann's length bargain between borrower and
lender and would eliminate the disadvantage at which current
for Secured Lenders: When Postpetition Revenue from a Hotel Is Not
Subject to a Prepetition Security Interest, 107 BANKING L.J. 484 (1990);
Ricardo R. Calderon, The Significance and Implications of the Rents Ver-
sus Accounts Receivable Debate in Hotel Bankruptcies, 21 REAL ESTATE
L.J. 136 (1992); Freyermuth, supra note 28.
272. Rent might be defined as "any right to payment for possession,
use, or occupancy of real property." This definition borrows from the
Restatement provision defining rents as "the proceeds payable by a les-
see, licensee, or other person for the right to possess, use, or occupy the
real property of another." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SECURITY
(MORTGAGES) § 4.2(a) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1992). Like the Restatement
definition, the proposed Article 9 definition of rents would include hotel
room charges and fees generated by parking facilities. Id. § 4.2 cmt. e.
See supra note 271. A full discussion of whether these types of income
from real property should be classified as rents is beyond the scope of
this Article.
273. Because of the lender's interest in seeing that the property is
properly operated and maintained, the lender would in many cases turn
over some of the rents to the borrower for application to costs of opera-
tion and maintenance.
274. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
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law places the lender. 5 The parties to a commercial loan
transaction should have the right to provide contractually for
the grant of a security interest in rents to the lender that can
be enforced in a reasonable manner and that extends to identi-
fiable proceeds. If the parties did not intend for the lender to
be able to enforce its security interest merely by giving notice
to tenants, the parties could simply provide in their agreement
for more onerous requirements. Mortgage loans involving rent-
al assignments are almost always commercial loans made to
persons in the business of operating income-producing real
property who do have negotiating power,"' and the law does
not need to provide protection for sophisticated commercial
borrowers."
If rents were covered by Article 9, the absolute assignment
of rents would no longer be necessary as a security device, and
the confusion caused by this device would be eliminated.
Where a borrower and lender intended a true sale of the rents
in satisfaction of some portion of the indebtedness, they could
accomplish that goal, and the factors discussed by the courts
with regard to distinguishing a sale of accounts from a security
interest in accounts would prove useful in distinguishing a sale
of rents from a security interest in rents.2T A consideration
of these factors would make it clear that an assignment of
rents made in connection with a mortgage loan is usually for
security rather than constituting a sale of the rents. Article 9
promotes a policy of substance over form by treating any trans-
action intended to create a security interest as a security inter-
275. See American Bar Association, Real Property Division, Report of
Committee on Real Estate Financing, Disposition of Rents After Mortgage
Default, 16 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 835, 837 (1981) [hereinafter ABA
Report on Rents].
276. If borrowers had no negotiating power, then lenders would collect
rents at the inception of most loans and control the release of funds to
the borrower for operation and maintenance.
277. The borrower in a commercial real estate loan is "sophisticated,
with ample access to professionals." ABA Report on Rents, supra note
275, at 837.
278. See Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d
538 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Evergreen Valley Resort, Inc., 23 B.R. 659




In bankruptcy, the Article 9 approach to rents would protect
the interests of both borrower and lender because rents in
which a lender had a security interest would be treated as
cash collateral regardless of whether the lender had taken any
action to begin collecting rents at the time of the commence-
ment of the bankruptcy and regardless of the form of the in-
strument creating the security interest. The Bankruptcy Code
should promote a policy of permitting a borrower to reorganize
where reorganization is possible and a policy of preventing
delay solely for the sake of delay where a reorganization is not
possible. Treating rents as cash collateral rather than as prop-
erty of either the lender or the estate alone would promote
both of these policies. Because the borrower, as debtor in pos-
session, would be entitled to use rents for operation and main-
tenance of the property,' the borrower could reach his goal
of reorganization if feasible, but because the borrower could
not use rents for other purposes, the lender's bargained-for
security interest in rents would be protected.
Because of the existing body of case law relating to Article 9,
a number of issues that would normally arise after a change in
the law would have already been addressed, thus decreasing
the amount of litigation that might ordinarily accompany a
change in the law. In fact, because of the comprehensiveness of
the Article 9 scheme for creating a security interest in ac-
counts, there has been relatively little litigation over the types
of issues that have arisen with regard to the current law gov-
erning assignments of rents."1
If Article 9 were amended to encompass rents, the wide
variance among the states in treatment of security interests in
rents would likely end. The UCC has been universally accepted
279. See U.C.C. § 9-102(1)-(2).
280. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
281. Because there seems to have been no confusion over the distinc-
tion between perfection and enforcement of an Article 9 security interest
in accounts, the author could find very few cases addressing the issues of
the treatment of proceeds of accounts as cash collateral. In addition,
there are relatively few cases addressing the issue of whether a particu-
lar transaction is a sale of accounts or the grant of a security interest in
them.
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in the various states, and amendments to the UCC have been
widely accepted. 2 The uniform treatment of rents in the vari-
ous states would permit lenders to lend money on a nationwide
basis in a more efficient manner.' Furthermore, the incor-
poration of rents into Article 9 would make the treatment of
rents as security for the mortgage loan more rational since the
UCC is intended to facilitate the modern commercial transac-
tion rather than being based on ancient real property concepts.
Finally, incorporation of rents into Article 9 might promote
the use of a new type of financing for owners of income-produc-
ing properties. Lenders might be willing to provide financing
secured only by rents of real property without requiring a
mortgage on the property itself if a rational means for obtain-
ing a security interest in rents were available."4
There may be other means of achieving the desired results
with respect to the creation of a security interest in rents.
Amendment of the Bankruptcy Code coupled with either the
enactment by state legislatures of ULSIA or the adoption by
state courts of the Restatement view as to assignments of rents
would produce a result similar to that which would be attained
by amendment of Article 9 to cover rents. Amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code are likely; however, state legislatures
have not been rushing to pass versions of ULSIA,"6 and state
282. U.C.C., Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Code Has Been Adopted, 3
U.L.A. 1 (1992). Every state except Vermont has now adopted the 1972
Revision to Article 9. Id.
283. See supra note 7.
284. Of course, a lender with a security interest in rents but not in
the real property to which they relate would not be able to take advan-
tage of Bankruptcy Code § 552(b), which provides an exception to the
general rule that property acquired by a bankruptcy estate after the com-
mencement of the bankruptcy proceeding is not subject to a pre-petition
lien. 11 U.S.C. § 552 (1988). Therefore, rents to be paid under leases
entered into after the borrower's commencement of bankruptcy would not
be covered by the lender's security interest. See supra notes 142 and 271.
285. See supra notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
286. Although a number of states have passed uniform statutes in the
property area, the more widely-adopted statutes have been those statutes
dealing with discrete areas of property law. See, e.g., UNIF. CONDOMINIUM
ACT, Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted, 7 U.L.A. 150
(Supp. 1993); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, Table of Jurisdctions
Wherein Act Has Been Adopted, "7A U.LA. 170 (Supp. 1993); UNIF. RESI-
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courts have not always followed the many provisions of the
numerous Restatements. Furthermore, neither ULSIA nor the
Restatement deals with rents issues in the detail that Article 9
deals with accounts, and no existing body of case law inter-
prets either ULSIA or the new Restatement. For these reasons,
amendment of Article 9 to cover rents is the best solution to
the problems under current law governing rents as security for
the mortgage loan.
D. Report of the PEB Study Group
The study committee appointed by the Permanent Editorial
Board for the UCC to recommend revisions to Article 9 did not
ultimately recommend that real property rents be included
within the scope of Article 9.7 A minority of the members of
the advisory group on real estate-related collateral felt that
Article 9 should be amended to encompass rents for many of
the same reasons espoused by the author of this Article.' A
majority of the members of the advisory group was of the opin-
ion, however, that Article 9 should not be so amended, giving
as reasons for the recommendation "that such a change would
be politically unwise, that such a change would make impossi-
ble many otherwise feasible reorganizations, and that it would
be unfair to allow the rents to go to a person who does not
have responsibility for the maintenance of the real estate." 9
The arguments advanced against the amendment of Article
9 to include real property rents do not provide sufficient justifi-
cation for such a position. The suggestion that the amendment
would be politically unwise is based on a concern that it "might
meet strong opposition from various interest groups and that
such opposition might in many states delay the enactment of
the entire package of Article 9 amendments.' 9 While this is
clearly a concern, it should not be the basis for rejecting this
DENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT, Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act
Has Been Adopted, 7B U.LA. 43 (Supp. 1993). Neither of the two com-
prehensive uniform statutes dealing with real property, the Uniform Land
Transactions Act or ULSIA, has yet to be adopted by any state.
287. See PEB STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 24, at 60-66.
288. 1& app. at 197-213.




amendment with its many advantages. If there were opposition
in a given state to the provision, it could be omitted from that
state's statute.29' In fact, there might not be as much opposi-
tion as anticipated based on the experience of Congress in its
hearings on amendments to the Bankruptcy Code with similar
effect in the bankruptcy arena.'
The concern that the amendment would adversely affect
otherwise feasible bankruptcy reorganizations is unfounded. If
rents were covered by Article 9, bankruptcy courts would not
face confusion over the distinction between perfection and
enforcement. Rents covered by a perfected security interest
would be treated as cash collateral which is available for use
by a debtor in possession for operation and maintenance of the
property.' Incorporation of rents into Article 9 would also
eliminate confusion caused by activated and absolute assign-
ments of rents. Even if a lender had enforced its Article 9
security interest by collecting rents, rents collected after a
bankruptcy filing would be cash collateral rather than property
of the lender.' Therefore, the amendment of Article 9 to in-
clude rents could actually promote otherwise feasible reorgani-
zations.
The objection of unfairness in allowing rents to be paid to a
lender with no obligation to maintain the property is simply
not valid. After a borrower's default, the lender with few excep-
tions has a greater interest in seeing that the property is prop-
erly maintained than does the borrower who is facing foreclo-
sure of the property, and the lender will therefore see that
291. State legislatures have not hesitated in the past to make revisions
to the official text of the UCC. Uniform Laws Annotated lists variations
between each section of the official text of the UCC and the correspond-
ing section adopted by the various jurisdictions under the heading "Action
in Adopting Jurisdictions." See, e.g., 3 U.L.A. 79, 153, 182 (1992).
292. A number of groups support the proposed amendment of the
Bankruptcy Code to treat a duly recorded assignment of rents as perfect-
ed, and the amendment has no organized opposition. See supra notes
177-78 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text. The probable
amendment of the Bankruptcy Code by Congress will produce this result
regardless of whether Article 9 is amended to encompass rents. See supra
notes 173-78 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
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funds are available to the borrower for operation and mainte-
nance. 5 What is unfair is allowing a borrower in default to
divert rents to uses other than operation and maintenance of
the property.
The arguments made by the majority of the members of the
advisory group on real estate-related collateral do not ade-
quately support the majority position. The drafting committee
charged with amending Article 9 should consider this Article
and the minority position report of the advisory committee
before making a determination about Article 9 applicability to
rents.
VI. CONCLUSION
The complexity of current law governing assignments of
rents leads to Confusion and raises serious issues for borrow-
ers, lenders, tenants of mortgaged property, and citizens in
general, all of whom are injured by policies which do not ade-
quately protect mortgaged property against waste. Inordinate
costs imposed on real estate lenders may make them reluctant
to loan money, and a negative impact on lenders' willingness to
loan money has serious implications for borrowers as well as
for our national economy. The taxpayers will ultimately have
to absorb the losses arising under current law on those loans
owned by the FDIC and RTC, and the problems caused in
bankruptcy by the confusion in the law governing assignments
of rents are so serious that Congress may be forced to preempt
state law in order to address one or more of the bankruptcy
issues. 6 The drafting committee charged with making revi-
sions to Article 9 should seriously consider amendment of Arti-
295. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
296. Lenders have mobilized to encourage the passage by Congress of
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that would ensure the treatment of
rents covered by a recorded but unactivated collateral assignment of
rents as cash collateral, see 1991 Senate Subcomm. Hearing, supra note
12, at 88 (statement of Mary Jane Flaherty on behalf of the American
Council of Life Insurance), 213 (statement of William L. Norton III on
behalf of the American Bankers Association), and borrowers should be
similarly concerned about the treatment of rents covered by an absolute
or activated assignment of rents as cash collateral of the bankruptcy
estate rather than as property of the lender.
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cle 9 to encompass rents, as recommended by the author, be-
cause treatment of rents under Article 9 would provide a solu-
tion to problems arising under current law and would provide
a uniform and rational approach to rents as security for the
mortgage loan.
